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SUMMARY
In response to the growing need for securing user data in the cloud, recent Intel processors
have supported a new feature, Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX). SGX allows a
program to execute in isolation from the rest of the underlying system. Thus, even after
compromising the system, neither cloud providers nor attackers can gain access to data
that the program processes. Unfortunately, recent studies have shown that such isolation
is bypassable via side-channel attacks (SCAs). In particular, SCAs against SGX are more
critical under the extreme assumption (i.e., attackers compromise the system), allowing
attackers to infer fine-grained information from an SGX-protected program.
Toward practical defenses against SCAs on SGX, the first part of the thesis presents two
mitigation techniques, SGX-Armor and T-SGX. SGX-Armor is a general-purpose defense
based on Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) that obfuscates the memory layout
of the program, preventing attackers from interpreting side-channel information. Unlike
traditional ASLR implementations, SGX-Armor incorporates a provably secure algorithm
that shuffles memory layout without revealing the information of the layout through any
of the known side channels. T-SGX is a novel defense against controlled-channel attacks
that exploit page faults as a side channel. By using Intel Transactional Synchronization
Extensions (TSX) as a primitive that suppresses page faults, T-SGX automatically transfers
a program into a protected one at compile time.
The second part of the thesis presents PRIDWEN, a framework that addresses the chal-
lenges of composing multiple mitigation techniques such as SGX-Armor and T-SGX,
thereby providing a broader scope of protection against SCAs on SGX. Using load-time
synthesis, PRIDWEN adaptively enforces mitigation schemes to a program in distinct cloud
environments. The prototype of PRIDWEN has supported four mitigation schemes that
secure SGX programs again various SCAs while minimizing the incurred runtime overhead




Over the past decade, an emerging computing paradigm that has rapidly evolved and
gained significant popularity is cloud computing. Cloud computing refers to a collection
of computing resources that provides on-demand services to remote users. Well-known
examples of such services include Amazon AWS, Microsoft Azure, IBM Cloud, and Google
Cloud Platform. An important benefit of these services is eliminating the need for users or
businesses to purchase and to maintain hardware by themselves. However, this convenience
comes with security concerns. One of the concerns is that once deploying data to a cloud
platform, a user loses complete control over the data. More specifically, the user cannot
prevent a cloud provider— who owns the platform and therefore has free access to the data—
from inspecting or misusing the data. This concern has become a significant obstacle that
hinders cloud adoption.
Solutions to the concern require protecting the data against cloud providers throughout
its lifecycle, including data in transit, at rest, and in use. However, existing practices focus
mostly on securing data in transit (e.g., cryptographic protocols) and at rest (e.g., disk
encryption) while failing to protect data in use. To fill this gap, research and industry
communities propose confidential computing, a new type of cloud computing. Confidential
computing ensures that the data in a cloud platform remains encrypted during the data-in-
use stage. The decrypted data is only available when the data enters a trusted execution
environment (TEE) that provides isolation against the rest of the platform. By utilizing data
encryption and TEEs, confidential computing allows users to process their data in the cloud
without exposing the content of the data to cloud providers.
More recently, cloud providers have started supporting confidential computing (e.g.,
Azure Confidential Computing and IBM Cloud Data Shield). The critical enabling imple-
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mentation of TEE is Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [1]. SGX provides a set
of instructions that allows a program to execute within an isolated region of memory, an
enclave. By incorporating a memory encryption engine (MEE) [2], SGX ensures that the
content of the enclave stays encrypted, except when the content enters a central processing
unit (CPU). The SGX-capable CPU enforces a strict access control that prevents all the code
—even privileged one in an operating system (OS) or a hypervisor— outside the enclave from
accessing its content. Consequently, users can deploy their programs to remote enclaves and
assure that these programs securely process their data.
Although SGX enforces enclave-based isolation, recent studies have shown that this
isolation is bypassable through side-channel attacks (SCAs). SCAs allow attackers to infer
the information of programs from the side effects of their executions. These side effects
usually stem from the implementation of underlying OSes or hardware. In-enclave programs,
without exception, cause similar side effects as normal programs do. Known, exploitable
side effects include the usage of page tables [3, 4], translation lookaside buffers (TLBs) [5],
CPU caches [6, 7, 8], branch prediction units [9, 10], and CPU pipelines (i.e., speculative
execution [11]). In typical settings, measuring the usage of these resources is mostly limited;
i.e., the attacker needs to have root privileges or to deal with a significant level of noise
from the OS. However, as SGX assumes powerful attackers (e.g., cloud providers) who can
eliminate these limitations, SCAs against enclaves become a more realistic, critical threat.
1.1 Research Objectives
This thesis work aims to devise practical defenses against SCAs on SGX. As the root
cause of SCAs stems from the implementation of hardware, a fundamental solution is
analyzing and modifying Intel CPUs or the SGX itself. Unfortunately, the implementation
details of Intel hardware are proprietary and therefore are mostly inaccessible to research
communities. Another type of solution is adopting cryptographic-based techniques such
as oblivious RAM (ORAM) [12, 13]. However, these techniques incur significant runtime
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overhead (e.g., causing the execution tens or hundreds times slower) and usually require
manual efforts to apply (e.g., rewriting source code), both of which hamper their adoption in
practice. In summary, we demand a practical, general solution that 1) requires no hardware
modifications, 2) incurs reasonable runtime overhead to enclaves, and 3) minimizes manual
efforts for its adoption. We present the objectives of the thesis toward this goal in the rest of
the thesis.
1.1.1 Retrofitting Existing Side-Channel Defenses
An existing defense technique that meets our requirements and has the potential to mitigate
SCAs is address space layout randomization (ASLR). ASLR is a software-based technique
that obfuscates the memory layout of a program binary. Initially, ASLR aims to prevent the
exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities in the program (i.e., hindering an attacker
from predicting target memory addresses). Since the goal of SCAs is inferring information
of the program through side-channel leakage (in terms of memory accesses), ASLR ideally
causes similar effects that prevent side-channel attackers from interpreting the leakage. With
the potential, researchers have proposed ASLR-based defenses against SCAs on SGX [14,
15, 16]. Unfortunately, these defenses fail to protect the implementation of ASLR itself,
allowing attackers to derandomize the layouts even before the program starts to execute. The
thesis attempts to address this problem by investigating the challenges of enabling ASLR on
SGX against SCAs. Moreover, the thesis seeks solutions that address these challenges.
1.1.2 Designing New Side-Channel Defenses
Based on the unusual assumption of SGX (i.e., attackers with root privileges), researchers
have demonstrated new types of SCAs. A representative example of such SCAs is controlled-
channel attacks [3] that use page faults as a side channel. To exploit page faults, an attacker
needs the abilities to manipulate the page table and to observe the occurrence of exceptions
(e.g., through the exception handler), both of which require root privileges. Having these
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abilities, the attacker unmaps the memory pages of an enclave, causing all the corresponding
accesses to trigger page faults. Consequently, the occurrence of these page faults allows the
attacker to learn precise, page-granular memory accesses of the enclave. Despite being a
standard mechanism that supports virtual memory in modern OSes, page faults impose a
unique threat to SGX. As a result, the thesis intends to defeat page-fault-based SCAs by
proposing new defenses.
1.1.3 Developing a General Side-Channel Defense Framework
The results of the thesis include two SCA defenses: an improved ASLR-based defense,
SGX-Armor, and a new defense, T-SGX [17], which targets at controlled-channel attacks.
An observation from these defenses is that using a single defense is insufficient to defeat
all the knows SCAs on SGX. Regarding the ASLR-based defense, even with our improved
design, the defense still subject to runtime attacks. Regarding T-SGX, the scheme focuses
specifically on the controlled-channel attacks and therefore fails to prevent other types of
SCAs (e.g., cache attacks). In addition to these two defenses, we note that all the other
proposed defenses [18, 19, 20, 21, 22] against SCAs on SGX suffer from similar limitations.
A naïve approach to address such limitations is combining distinct defenses that collectively
provide a broader scope of protection. However, this approach may not work in practice be-
cause some of the defenses are 1) non-deployable in target environments lacking the support
of dependent hardware features, 2) redundant if target environments are immune to some
types of SCAs, and 3) incompatible with each other by design or implementation. Statically
identifying all of such conditions and preparing potential workarounds are challenging,
primarily when a program targets multiple cloud platforms that abstract or manipulate their




SGX-Armor. The first contribution of the thesis work toward fulfilling the objective §1.1.1
is an improved ASLR-based defense, SGX-Armor. In this work, we thoroughly analyze
enabling ASLR on SGX-like environments that are subject to SCAs. Our results include
two new SCAs against SGX-Shield [14], the only public implementation of ASLR for SGX.
One of the attacks completely infers the ASLR code layout as the implementation positions
the code in memory. The other attack targets the runtime of the program, allowing the
attacker to derandomize the majority of the memory layout. In response to these attacks, we
present SGX-Armor, which incorporates an alternative algorithm for producing randomized
memory layouts, which is immune to all known types of SCAs on SGX. Besides, our
results indicate that using ASLR alone is insufficient to defeat SCAs that target its runtime
phase. On the other hand, ASLR may still be effective against broader types of SCAs when
combing our layout generation algorithm with a defense that limits side-channel leakage
during the runtime of the program.
T-SGX. The second contribution of the thesis work regarding the objective §1.1.2 is a new
defense, T-SGX, which target at controlled-channel attacks. T-SGX presents a novel usage
of a commodity component of the Intel CPU, Transactional Synchronization Extensions
(TSX), which implements hardware transactional memory. More specifically, TSX allows
programs to execute concurrently inside hardware-assisted transactions that automatically
detect conflicts among these executions. A conflict, including not only access to shared
memory but also an exception such as a page fault, results in aborting the ongoing transaction.
An attractive property of TSX is that the abort also suppresses the notification of exception
to the underlying OS, which implies that the attacker cannot know whether a page fault
has occurred during the transaction. T-SGX, by utilizing this property of TSX, carefully
isolates the effect of attempts to tap running enclaves, thereby entirely eradicating the
controlled-channel attacks. To be practical, we implement T-SGX as a compiler-based
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scheme that transforms a program into a secure one without requiring manual source code
modification or annotation.
PRIDWEN. The last contribution of the thesis work with regard to the objective §1.1.3 is a
general SCA defense framework, PRIDWEN, which addresses the challenges of composing
multiple defenses, thereby providing general protection against all the known SCAs on
SGX. PRIDWEN is a framework that dynamically and selectively applies multiple defenses
when loading a program according to the configurations of a cloud environment. PRIDWEN
allows a developer to deploy a program in the form of WebAssembly (Wasm) to distinct
environments along with a pre-installed, in-enclave loader. Upon receiving a Wasm binary,
the loader probes the current hardware configuration and synthesizes a program (i.e., a native
binary) with an optimal set of defenses applied. Through the selection of defenses, PRIDWEN
strives to maintain a similar level of protection across environments while minimizing the
incurred runtime overhead. A PRIDWEN prototype supports software-only or hardware-
assisted defenses that protect arbitrary in-enclave programs from various SCAs.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The outline of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 provides the necessary background
information for this thesis. Chapter 3 presents SGX-Armor along with two new SCAs
against typical ASLR implementations under the assumptions of SGX. Chapter 4 details
the design of T-SGX, including the novel use of TSX and a compiler-based scheme that
automatically transforms an SGX program into a TSX-enforced one. Chapter 5 introduces
PRIDWEN, including design, implementation, the support of multiple mitigation schemes,




2.1 Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX)
To ensure the security (i.e., integrity and confidentiality) of applications running in untrusted
environments (e.g., the cloud), Intel has introduced a set of ISA extensions, Intel Software
Guard Extensions (SGX) [1], to its recent CPUs. SGX consists of a set of instructions that
supports the instantiation of isolated containers, enclaves, that are protected from all other
software on the computer. SGX maps the code and data inside the enclave to a dedicated
memory region, the Enclave Page Cache (EPC), within the main memory. To secure the
enclave memory during the enclave runtime, SGX enforces a strict memory access policy
that prevents accesses from not only user-level software (e.g., applications or other enclaves)
but also privileged ones (e.g., an operating system or a hypervisor). To mitigate physical
attacks such as memory bus spoofing or cold boot attacks [23], SGX incorporates a memory
encryption engine, the Memory Encryption Engine (MEE), that keeps EPC pages encrypted
while residing in the main memory. The MEE maintains a Merkle tree for the entire EPC
region to detect any modification of code and data inside [2].
Enclave initialization. The operating system creates and initializes the enclave. It allocates
EPC memory for the enclave and copies the target code and data into it. Relying on untrusted
code is acceptable because SGX allows users to verify that the enclave was created correctly.
The CPU maintains an enclave digest that captures exactly how the enclave was constructed.
SGX supports remote attestation [24] such that users can verify that an enclave with the
correct digest was created. However, putting the operating system in charge of enclave
construction also means that the memory layout of the enclave is known to the attacker who






















Figure 2.1: Steps of an SGX asynchronous enclave exit (AEX). 1 The CPU stores register values
and the exit reason into the state save area (SSA) inside the enclave. 2 The CPU loads synthetic data
into registers. 3 The enclave exits directly to the kernel space exception handler. 4 The exception
handler handles the interrupt and returns to the trampoline. 5 The trampoline resumes the enclave.
6 The CPU restores the stored register values and resumes enclave execution. Besides, the trampoline
can call an application exception handler inside the enclave to handle exceptions the OS cannot
process.
tackles this fundamental problem.
2.2 Exceptions in SGX
An exception is an erroneous condition that occurs during a CPU execution, such as divide
by zero (#DE), invalid opcode (#UD), general protection fault (#GP), and page fault (#PF).
Conventionally, exceptions are delivered to system software for further investigation using
default handlers or user-defined handlers. Such handlers can retrieve the exception code and
the entire process context (e.g., register values). However, conventional exception handling
does not work for SGX because it does not trust system software such that revealing the
exception code and the process context to the systems software should be prohibited. To
minimize information leakage during exception handling, SGX defines two mechanisms,
Asynchronous Enclave Exit (AEX) and a custom exception handler [25, 26].
Asynchronous enclave exit (AEX). During the AEX, the original exception code and
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register context are stored into the State Save Area (SSA) inside the enclave and then
overwritten by synthetic data. Figure 2.1 depicts how the AEX is conducted. The CPU first
stores the enclave’s register context and exit reasons (e.g., exception code) in SSA and loads
synthetic values into the registers. In the case of page faults, the CPU provides the OS only
with the base address of the faulting page and not with the exact address. It then transfers
control to the regular OS kernel exception handler. Eventually, the exception handler will
return control to a user-mode trampoline function outside the enclave, which can call the
ERESUME instruction. ERESUME will restore the enclave’s saved register context and resume
enclave execution.
Custom exception handlers. SGX allows developers to define custom exception handlers
to process exceptions inside an enclave. These custom exception handlers can retrieve the
SSA to check the stored exception code and registers (i.e., GPRSGX.EXITINFO.VECTOR and
GPRSGX.<registers>), and to change them (e.g., GPRSGX.RIP) to resume execution.
Limitations. Although the AEX hides the register context and the exact address of an
exception, information about the exception still leaks to the OS. For example, after each
page fault, the OS learns which page the enclave attempted to access. This information is
the basis for the controlled-channel attack [3]. Whenever an exception is generated during
an enclave execution, the CPU exits from the enclave asynchronously.
2.3 Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs)
Unlike attacks that exploit the vulnerabilities inside a program (e.g., code-reuse attacks) and
disclose its sensitive information or hijack its control flow, SCAs infer information about
the program by observing physical effects caused by its operation. One classic example is
timing-based attacks [27] that extract information from a program by measuring its execution
time. More recently, the focus has shifted from timing attacks to microarchitectural side-
channel attacks that exploit microarchitectural components (e.g., caches [28, 29] and branch
predictors [30]) and allow attackers to infer finer-grained information. However, given the
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high complexity of modern computer systems, side-channel attacks generally suffer from a
significant amount of noise in practice.
SCAs against SGX. Enclaves share most microarchitectural components with the rest
of the underlying system and therefore are inherently vulnerable to SCAs. Given the
assumption that an attacker controls the operating system, several side-channel attacks have
been demonstrated. Revealing page access patterns [3, 4, 31, 32, 33] by monitoring page
faults or access and dirty bits is one of the most unique and well-known SCAs against
SGX. Traditional cache SCAs work against SGX with different configurations [6, 8, 34,
35, 5]. Interrupt execution time can be used to infer which instructions have been executed
within an enclave [36, 37]. Branch prediction behaviors [9, 10] are exploited to infer the
results of branch instructions in an enclave. Speculative SCAs [38, 39] are feasible to Intel
SGX. Foreshadow [11], or L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF), can leak enclave memory through the
L1 cache. Recently, Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) SCAs that leverage several
internal buffers of Intel CPUs to leak sensitive information have been discovered [40, 41,
42]. In the adversary model of this thesis work, we assume that an attacker can launch the
major types of well-known attacks against an enclave.
2.4 Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
Among the numerous defenses against code-reuse attacks such as return-oriented program-
ming (ROP) [43], the most widely adopted one in the real world is address space layout
randomization (ASLR). ASLR aims to block the attacks’ requirement of knowing the exact
addresses of target code snippets (gadgets) by randomizing the memory layout of the pro-
gram such that guessing the address of a gadget is computationally difficult. For example,
initial ASLR techniques [44] that are widely deployed in mass-market operating systems
randomize the base address of executables. More advanced (fine-grained) ASLR tech-
niques randomize the process layout at a much finer granularity. This includes rearranging
the addresses of functions [45, 46, 47, 48, 49], basic blocks [50, 51], or even individual
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instructions [52].
Attacks on ASLR. One apparent threat to ASLR is memory disclosure [53]. These attacks
require the existence of a memory disclosure vulnerability in the victim program; i.e., a
vulnerability that allows the attacker to read arbitrary addresses in the victim’s address space.
This is a strong assumption. In particular, a memory disclosure vulnerability in an enclave
would be equivalent to a complete breakdown in enclave confidentiality, thus negating one
of the main benefits of running under SGX. Our attacks do not rely on this assumption.
Several authors use side channels to attack ASLR [54, 30, 55, 56, 57]. These attacks have
been demonstrated only against traditional non-fine-grained variants of ASLR, in which
the attacker has to find only a single pointer (i.e., code or data pointers) that can be used to
infer the base address of the program. This limitation probably arises from the noisy nature
of side channels in a traditional (non-SGX) setting. In contrast, we consider the impact of
stronger SGX side-channel attacks against fine-grained ASLR in the work of SGX-Armor.
2.5 Intel Transactional Synchronization Extension (TSX)
In this section, we explain Intel Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX), which is
Intel’s implementation of hardware transactional memory (HTM) [58]. HTM was originally
proposed to reduce the overhead of acquiring locks for mutual exclusion and to simplify
concurrent programming. With HTM, a thread can transactionally execute in a critical
section without any explicit software-based lock such as a spinlock or mutex. If a transaction
completes without conflict, all of its read and write attempts are committed to memory.
Otherwise, all of intermediate read and write attempts are rolled back (never exposed to the
real memory) and a fallback (or abort) handler that was registered at the beginning of the
transaction is invoked. The fallback handler decides whether to retry the transaction. Intel
TSX supports two different interfaces, namely, hardware lock elision (HLE) and restricted
transactional memory (RTM). Regarding the work of T-SGX, we focus only on RTM.




3 // begin a transaction
4 if ((status = _xbegin()) == _XBEGIN_STARTED) {
5 // execute a transaction
6 [code]
7 // atomic commit
8 _xend();
9 } else {
10 // abort
11 }
Figure 2.2: A basic example of Intel TSX. _xbegin() initiates a transaction region to execute [code]
and _xend() closes the region. An exception at [code] makes the control flow go to the else block.
initiate a transactional execution using XBEGIN and terminate it using XEND. It can use XABORT
to terminate a transaction and XTEST to test whether it is currently executing in a transaction.
Figure 2.2 shows a code snippet that uses TSX. It first executes _xbegin() (i.e., XBEGIN)
to begin a transaction. If it succeeds, _xbegin() returns _XBEGIN_STARTED and continues
to execute the code inside the if block (line 6). If there is no conflict, the program will
eventually execute _xend() (i.e., XEND) to atomically commit all the intermediate results.
However, if there is a conflict or an exception, the transaction is rolled back and the program
executes the else block (line 10) to handle the error.
Technical details. Understanding the technical details of the TSX implementation [59] is
important because such details can explain why TSX exhibits the fallback behavior upon a
transaction. During a transaction, HTM needs a buffer to store intermediate data read or
written, so it can commit them to memory at the end of the successful transaction. Instead
of introducing a separate buffer, TSX uses the L1 cache as a buffer. This choice was made
not only to avoid extra storage requirements but also to simplify the implementation of
TSX; it piggybacks on the existing cache coherence protocol to detect memory read or write
conflicts without introducing complex new logic. The cache coherence protocol maintains
data consistency between the caches of different cores such that TSX can detect data conflicts
at the granularity of cache lines and roll back a transaction when a conflict occurs.
Transaction Abort. When two transactions conflict with each other (e.g., their read and
write sets overlap), one will be canceled, and thus aborted (see §2.5). TSX also aborts
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a transaction when encountering an exception because a ring transition is not possible
while executing a transaction. In the case of synchronous exceptions that occur during
the execution of a specific instruction (e.g., page fault, general protection fault, divide-
by-zero), the exception is not delivered to the OS because TSX intentionally suppresses
it ([26, §15.3.8.2]). On the other hand, an asynchronous exception (e.g., timer interrupt
and I/O interrupt) will be delivered right after a transaction is aborted and rolled back,
because suppressing such interrupts would make user-space processes non-preemptable,
which would interfere with OS scheduling.
Handling SGX exceptions with TSX. Using TSX inside SGX enclaves makes it possible
to route exceptions such as page faults to TSX abort code inside the enclave and not to the
ring-0 exception handler of the untrusted OS. This deprives attackers of all information
about page faults and allows the enclave to identify potential attacks. We describe a design
based on this observation in §4.4.
2.6 WebAssembly (Wasm)
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) proposes Wasm [60] as a platform-independent
compilation target for various high-level languages (e.g., C/C++ and Rust). A Wasm binary
has language-like syntax and structure that are suitable for compilation and instrumentation.
The basic executable unit of code in Wasm is a module that consists of multiple sections,
where each section contains specific definitions of the module such as global variables,
functions, and a sequence of instructions of each function. The execution model of a
Wasm instruction is based on a stack machine; i.e., each instruction manipulates values on
an implicit operand stack, popping argument values and pushing result values. Besides,
the model supports only the structured control flow such as if-else and loops without
goto statements, enabling single-pass fast compilation. Lastly, to provide memory safety,
Wasm prohibits any direct memory access and function call. Instead, they have to be
indirectly accessed or invoked via indices. Because the Wasm binary is well-structured and
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friendly for efficient Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation, PRIDWEN adopts Wasm as light-weight
Intermediate Representation (IR) for supporting load-time synthesis.
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CHAPTER 3
SECURING ASLR ON SGX AGAINST MULTIFACETED SIDE-CHANNEL
ATTACKS
3.1 Introduction
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) such as ARM Trustzone [61] and Intel SGX [62]
have been attracting significant interest in the research community and are seeing adoption
in industry [63, 64]. They allow small security-sensitive programs to run in isolation from
the rest of the software on the platform, which is typically large, complex, and potentially
compromised. TEEs protect the confidentiality and integrity of code running inside them
even if the rest of the platform (including the operating system) is compromised.
As compelling as these systems are, they do not offer protection from vulnerabilities
within the trusted software itself. For example, Lee et at. [65] demonstrate that a single mem-
ory corruption vulnerability in an SGX enclave program can result in a complete breakdown
of confidentiality and integrity even if the vulnerable binary is not known to the attacker.
This situation makes generic defenses that can protect entire classes of vulnerabilities from
being exploited highly desirable. Techniques such as control-flow integrity (CFI) [66],
address space layout randomization (ASLR) [44], data execution prevention (DEP) [67],
and stack canaries [68] are widely deployed in mass-market commercial systems and have
kept countless bugs from becoming exploitable vulnerabilities.
Despite the undeniable benefits of these generic defenses, their deployment in TEEs
is, at best, incomplete. The reason lies in the additional challenges posed by the TEE
environment. Some of the defenses such as CFI or stack canaries are compiler-based and can
be effortlessly deployed into TEEs. However, other defenses require system support that is
not readily available in existing TEEs. In particular, ASLR, which is the focus of this thesis
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work, typically requires assistance by the operating system in producing the randomized
memory layout. However, in the TEE threat model, the operating system is the attacker.
SGX-Shield [14] solves this problem by placing a loader into the enclave that produces a
randomized layout of the application binary.
A more fundamental obstacle to deploying ASLR on TEEs is the existence of various
side channels that may leak the randomized layout to the attacker. For SGX, highly accurate
versions of cache- [6, 7, 8] and page-table-based channels [3, 4] have been demonstrated.
These channels reveal the locations of memory accesses such as those used to read instruc-
tions as they are executed. In addition, the branch-prediction-based channel [9, 10] leaks
whether conditional branches were taken. Various other cache-based side channels have also
been demonstrated for Trustzone [69, 70]. Using processor hardware that only the operating
system can access (e.g., hardware performance counters, page tables), these attacks obtain
perfect or near-perfect signals, allowing the attacker to observe where code is originally
placed in memory and where code is executed once the application starts running.
This thesis claims that when multiple side-channels (e.g., cache, page-table, and branch
prediction) are combined in a multifaceted side-channel attack, implementing a perfectly
secure ASLR scheme is difficult in practice, especially under the strong threat model of Intel
SGX. In particular, we identify two attack vectors: First, the attacker can try to observe how
the randomized binary is laid out in memory. Second, the attacker can observe the execution
of the application binary. We present a simple attack on the initial layout generation phase
of SGX-Shield that completely derandomizes the layout. The attack applies not only to
SGX-Shield, but to a broad class of ASLR schemes that partition a binary into code units
and use an in-enclave loader to place the code units into random locations. Our attack
combines the page-table- and the cache-based side channels, which are complementary to
each other, to track the actions of the loader as it copies the code units to their destinations.
In light of a number of results that demonstrate the high-resolution and accuracy of these
channels in the SGX model [3, 6, 7, 8, 4, 71], we follow the approach of prior work (e.g.,
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Stacco [72] and DATA [73]) and use an abstract side-channel model, rather than building a
physical side-channel implementation (which has been done many times).
One of the key challenges for the in-enclave loader is to produce the layout without
leaking critical information through side channels. We solve this challenge by designing
an efficient layout algorithm that is provably secure against side-channel leakage. The
algorithm makes use of results from the theory of switching networks [74], which guarantee
that an array of n elements will be almost randomly shuffled after applying O(n log n)
appropriately positioned switches. A switch receives as input two fixed array positions
that are public and known to the attacker and a secret bit. Depending on the secret bit,
the switch either swaps the contents of the two array positions or leaves them unchanged.
We treat the binary as an array of code units and use a switching network together with a
carefully designed non-leaking switch to obtain a randomized layout. Our construction also
handles relocations (adjusting relative and absolute addresses in the binary) without leaking
information.
This construction solves the problem of creating the initial layout. However, information
about the memory layout can still leak as the application executes. We present a runtime
attack that leverages this information to identify the precise locations of the code units
executed by the program. The attack builds a dynamic control-flow graph (DCFG) from the
execution trace the attacker observes through multiple side channels. It then matches the
observed DCFG against the known DCFG of the non-randomized binary. We evaluate the
attack on SQLite [75], Lighttpd [76], and Libjpeg [77], three widely deployed open source
libraries. Our results show that the attack recovers on average 94.9% of the fine-grained
randomized layouts produced by SGX-Shield.
While several side-channel attacks against ASLR are known [54, 30, 55, 56, 57], these
attacks target traditional (non-fine-grained) ASLR. In contrast, this thesis presents the first
attack against a state-of-the-art fine-grained ASLR system. Attacking fine-grained ASLR
poses significant, additional challenges as the amount of entropy in a fine-grained ASLR
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layout is many times higher than in the traditional case. Traditional ASLR can typically be
defeated by disclosing a single address in the randomized binary. This level of information
disclosure reveals only a negligible fraction of a fine-grained ASLR layout. We are able
to solve the additional challenges by working in the stronger TEE attack model, in which
the attacker controls the operating system. In contrast, existing attacks on ASLR assume
unprivileged attackers.
Finally, we implement a system, SGX-Armor. Its main component is a secure in-
enclave loader that uses our layout algorithm to prevent the attack against initial layout
generation. We evaluate the security and performance of SGX-Armor and discuss several
other countermeasures that could potentially thwart the runtime attack.
In summary, this thesis work makes the following contributions:
• We construct a multifaceted side-channel attack against the layout generation of ASLR
schemes in a general form, and demonstrate it against SGX-Shield.
• We present a similar attack that infers the randomized layout from the execution of
the application (as opposed to layout generation).
• We design a new countermeasure for layout generation that is provably resistant to
side channels.
The conclusion from these results is that SGX-Shield, the only existing ASLR system
for SGX, does not provide robust ASLR under the SGX attack model. This is not a trivial
shortcoming of SGX-Shield, but appears to apply to a broad class of existing fine-grained
ASLR systems if one were to transplant them directly into the SGX attack model. We
demonstrate that an ASLR system can robustly generate a randomized layout in the presence
of powerful side-channel attackers. However, the problem of keeping the application from
leaking this layout as it executes is still open.
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3.2 Threat Model
This section outlines our threat model, which includes: a system model for running an
enclave; an ASLR model that defines the class of ASLR systems we consider; and an
adversary model that allows an attacker to use the three powerful side-channels to attack
ASLR on SGX.
3.2.1 System Model
An untrusted, adversarial operating system runs on a fully functional SGX-enabled processor.
The processor suffers from the standard known side channels in x86/64 processors, including
cache, branch-prediction, and timing channels. However, the processor does not have further
uncontrolled side-channel leaks. In particular, we assume that the timing, memory access
pattern, and possible branch-prediction artifacts of simple integer instructions such as add
and memory access operations such as mov do not depend on the values being added or
stored. While integer division as well as floating point division and square root do not have
this property on at least some x86 processor models [78], our security arguments will not
depend on these instructions.
A program runs inside a correctly configured enclave that guarantees the integrity of
the program and prevents external accesses from the operating system. However, the
operating system knows the initial layout of the enclave. Moreover, the enclave is subject to
side-channel attacks. The enclave does not adopt any existing defense mechanism against
side-channel attacks. We discuss such defenses in §3.7. The enclave program has access
to a random number generator whose outputs are not visible outside the enclave (i.e., the
rdrand instruction).
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Table 3.1: The summary of published fine-grained ASLR systems. Level represents the granularity
of the randomization. A: base address. F: function. P: page. B: basic block. I: instruction.
Project Description Level Load-timesupport
PaX ASLR [44] Base address randomization A ✓
Bhatkar et al. [45] Source code transformation F
ASLP [46] Binary re-writing F
Giuffrida et al. [47] Link-time transformation F
Readactor [48] Compile-time transformation F
Marlin [49] Binary re-writing F ✓
pagerando [79] Compile- and link-time transformation P ✓
Oxymoron [80] Binary re-writing P ✓
Binary Stirring [50] Binary re-writing B ✓
XIFER [51] Binary re-writing B
kRˆX [81] Compile-time transformation B
SGX-Shield [14] Compile-time transformation B ✓
ILR [52] Binary re-writing & VM support I
ORP [82] Binary re-writing & In-place randomization I
Homescu et al. [83] Compile-time NOP insertion I
3.2.2 ASLR Model
The program running inside the enclave is protected by ASLR. More specifically, we assume
fine-grained ASLR that is immune to the known attacks [54, 30, 55, 56, 57] against
traditional, non-fine-grained variants. Given the diversity of the published ASLR systems as
shown in Table 3.1, we define a simple ASLR model to make clear what types of ASLR
systems our results apply to. Our model is based on SGX-Shield, the only published, fine-
grained ASLR system for SGX. However, it also aims to include the hypothetical systems
that would result from a simple port to the SGX environment of a large portion of previous
work.
Our model ASLR system partitions the program into code units and places them inde-
pendently at random addresses. A code unit can be a function, a page, a basic block, or a
similar unit. To address the problem that the operating system knows the initial layout of
the enclave, the model defers the process of generating the randomized layout to the enclave
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code_unit2:                jmp
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Figure 3.1: An example enclave under our ASLR model. Red arrows indicate that the destinations
of jmp instructions require updates.
runtime. When the enclave first starts running, a small piece of code inside the enclave, the
loader, copies each code unit a randomized address. The original, non-randomized program
binary can either be placed inside the enclave at enclave creation time or be read by the
loader from a location outside the enclave.
The loader and the program binary are public and known to the adversary. As a result,
the random bits used by the loader to generate the randomized layout and the layout itself
are the only secret information used in our model. The binary contains metadata that the
loader can use to identify code units and to perform relocations. The loader consists of two
phases. The loading phase copies each of the program’s code units to a random address. The
relocation phase adjusts the relocatable addresses within all the code units. After finishing
the two phases, the loader transfers control to the program. As in SGX-Shield, the loader
has no provision for hiding or obfuscating its memory accesses.
In this model, every program execution has a different randomized layout. This should
prevent even sophisticated attacks [84, 65] in which the attacker does not know the target
binary. In these cases, an attacker has to find gadgets by trial-and-error, which entail a
large number of program crashes and restarts. The attack breaks down if the location of the
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gadgets changes after each restart.
3.2.3 Adversary Model
Similar to the original threat model of SGX, we assume that the attacker controls the
operating system. The enclave program may suffer from one or more vulnerabilities (e.g.,
memory corruption). The attacker’s ultimate goal is to exploit one such vulnerability by
means of control-flow hijacking. Because the binary of the program is public, the attacker
can freely analyze it and find vulnerabilities. He also sees the static code layout of the
program. Based on this knowledge, he can, in the absence of ASLR, locate code gadgets in
the program and launch code-reuse attacks such as ROP. However, the enclave implements
fine-grained ASLR based on our model, which effectively mitigates such attacks.
As fine-grained ASLR prevents the attacker from knowing the addresses of the code
gadgets, his goal becomes derandomizing the code layout. To this end, the attacker learns
about the code layout by launching side-channel attacks against the enclave that do not
require causing crashes. More precisely, our attacker can launch the following three state-of-
the-art side-channel attacks.
1 Page-table-based attacks. This type of attack manipulates the page-table entries (e.g.,
present [3] or A/D bits [4]) that maintain the mapping between the virtual address of the
enclave and the corresponding physical address. By observing either page faults or A/D
bit changes in page-table entries, the attacker can infer the exact page-granular memory
accesses of the enclave.
2 Cache-based attacks. Similar to traditional cache-based attacks, this type of attack
utilizes the prime+probe technique [29], which infers the cache-line-granular memory
accesses of the enclave. Several authors [85, 6, 7, 8] have demonstrated that the strong
adversary model (i.e., the attacker controls the operating system) allows the attack to infer
the cache-level accesses with much less noise than the traditional settings do.
3 Branch-prediction-based attacks. This type of attack infers information about a branch
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instruction by exploiting branch-prediction units. Previous work [9, 10] has shown that an
attacker who knows the address of a branch instruction inside an enclave and its target can
determine if the enclave program has taken the branch or not.
Channel resolution. A series of results use the local APIC timer in attacks on SGX
that achieve high temporal resolution [8, 9, 7, 71]). SGX-Step [71], the latest of these
results, demonstrates true single-stepping through enclave code. In particular, SGX-Step
programs the local APIC timer, and thus interrupting the enclave execution after precisely
one instruction has been executed. This has been demonstrated for enclave executions
involving hundreds of thousands of fast instructions without a single instance of more than
one instruction being executed between interrupts. In light of this result, we assume that
the attacker can single-step through the enclave. That is, the attacker can interrupt enclave
execution after every single executed instruction.
The spatial resolution of each side channel is given by the underlying hardware. The
resolution of the page-table side channel is limited to the size of a 4 kB page, which provides
address bits only 12 to 63 of each memory access. The resolution of the cache-based side
channel on the L1 cache is limited to a 64-byte cache line, which allows the attacker to
distinguish addresses that differ only in bits 6 to 11. The branch-prediction channel can
provide detailed control-flow information if the attacker knows the address of the targeted
branch instruction. The latter may not be the case under ASLR. Therefore, our multifaceted
side-channel attacks use only the first two channels, which allows the attacker to observe
address bits 6 to 63 of each memory access.
The addresses of code units that are smaller than 64 bytes may differ only in bits 0 to
5. For example, SGX-Shield supports a mode with 32-byte code units. Even a perfect L1
cache attack will not be able to identify the position of the code unit within the cache line.
In the case of 32-byte SGX-Shield, this results in 1 bit of uncertainty for the attacker. The
code unit could be at offset 0 or 32 within the identified 64-byte address range (a cache line),
since SGX-Shield places code units at 32-byte-aligned addresses. The typical instruction
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size combined with the need for an instruction at the end of the code unit to transfer control
to the next code unit makes it difficult to envision code units that are consistently smaller
than 16 bytes. Thus, the uncertainty resulting from the limited resolution of the cache side
channel seems to be bounded by 2 bits.
An attacker can try to resolve this uncertainty by guessing and rerunning the victim until
he succeeds. For 32-byte code units, the attacker will need an average of two guesses to find
the precise address of a code unit. If the attacker requires three gadgets that are the same as
the ones in the RIPE benchmark [86], he will need a maximum of 23 = 8 guesses to make
his ROP attack succeed.
Since the focus of this thesis work is the viability of ASLR under SGX, rather than
demonstrating the effectiveness of physical side channels (which has been done previously [6,
7, 8, 3, 4]), we follow the approach of prior work [72, 73] and construct our attacks assuming
that the underlying side channels exist. That is, rather than implementing three separate
known physical side-channel attacks, we extract the information that could be obtained from
each of the side channels from the trace of an enclave execution (see §3.5.2).
3.3 New Attacks against ASLR
This section describes two new multifaceted side-channel attacks against ASLR. One attack
targets the layout generation phases of the loader. Another attack recovers the randomized
layout through collecting the runtime execution trace of the target program.
3.3.1 Attacks on Randomized Layout Generation
Regardless of the details of the ASLR scheme, the loader has to move all code units from
their locations in the original binary to their randomized addresses. Furthermore, the
loader has to update all relocatable addresses to produce functional code. Importantly, the
memory accesses involved in these operations are subject to side-channel leakage. Thus,
by observing the loader’s memory accesses through the multifaceted side channels—the
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combination of cache- and page-table-based side-channels—the attacker can try to learn
the entire randomized layout even before the program starts. We show two separate attacks
against the two phases of the loader.
Attack on loading. Assume the program consists of n code units. The goal of the attack is
to learn the randomized address of each code unit, which we denote as addr rand [i], where
i = 1, 2, ..., n. Similarly, we use addr init [i] to represent the address of each code unit prior
to loading. During loading, the loader copies each code unit i from addr init [i] to addr rand [i].
Because the static layout of the program (i.e., the layout in the binary) and the base address
of the program before loading are public, the attacker knows addr init [i]. Based on this
knowledge, he explicitly constructs a table T with n entries that are indexed by addr init [i].
The goal of the attacker is to add the correct addr rand [i] to each table entry i. The
attacker uses the cache- and the page-table-based side channel to collect a trace of all the
memory accesses made during the loading and tries to identify the pattern that associates a
write to addr rand [i] with a read from addr init [i] for each i. The details of this step depend
on the implementation of the loader. However, since the loader’s code is public and the
loader does not try to obfuscate its memory accesses, it should be easy for the attacker to
identify the accesses to addr rand [i].
Attack on relocation. After the loading phase, the loader has to adjust the relative and
absolute addresses based on the randomized layout. The metadata part of the binary contains
a relocation table Relo_T . An entry in the relocation table Relo_T includes a pointer to a
code address (e.g., the address of an instruction’s operand within a code unit) of the program
that contains a relocatable address (e.g., the value of the operand) requiring an update and
the necessary information for the update.
A typical loader begins at the start of Relo_T and sequentially reads its entries. For
each entry, the loader retrieves the code address, which contains a relocatable address,
and computes the value for updating the relocatable address. Then, the loader writes the
new value to the code address. An attacker observes the loader’s memory accesses during
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this phase (via the cache- and page-table-based side channels) and identifies the relevant
reads from Relo_T and writes to the corresponding code addresses. As a consequence, the
attacker learns the final positions of each code address listed in Relo_T in the randomized
layout. This reveals the randomized addresses of all code units that contain relocatable
addresses. As in the previous attack, the attacker should be able to find the relevant memory
operations in the trace because both the program binary and the loader are public and the
loader does not attempt to obfuscate its memory accesses.
As mentioned earlier, the address resolution of our multifaceted side channel is up to 64
bytes, and the attacks in this subsection will not be able to observe the exact addresses if the
code units are smaller. This does not affect the operation of the two attacks.
3.3.2 Attack on ASLR at Runtime
In addition to the attacks on layout generation, we present an attack that works even if the
loader leaks no information about the randomized layout. The core idea of the attack is
that, because every executed instruction involves an instruction fetch (memory access), an
attacker listening on the cache- and page-table-based side channels will see the randomized
addresses of the code units as the enclave program executes them. This trace of executed
code units contains information about the program’s runtime control flow. For example,
short patterns of code units that are repeated several times are indicative of loops, and the
number of code units in the loop, the number of repetitions in the trace (i.e., loop iterations)
and their position in the trace may uniquely identify one particular loop in the binary,
allowing the attacker to associate the observed randomized addresses with concrete code
units in the binary.
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Algorithm 1 Runtime attack
Step 1: Side-channel attack
1: Given an enclave that runs a program P with an unknown layout and an unknown input:
2: side_channel_trace ← collect the runtime trace of P
Step 2: Off-line analysis
3: DCFG t ← build_DCFG(side_channel_trace)
4: Given the same program binary P with a known memory layout and a set of inputs Inp:
5: for all i ∈ Inp do
6: trace i ← collect the runtime trace of P given i
7: DCFG i ← build_DCFG(trace i)
8: Ii ← match_DCFGs(DCFGt , DCFGi)
9: Ifinal ← Ii with the maximum number of matched vertices, ∀i ∈ Inp
The attack is described in detail in Algorithm 1. The first step (line 2) is to perform a
side-channel attack while the victim is running. As stated earlier, the attacker can obtain
a single-instruction-granular trace of the instructions executed by the victim by using the
technique of SGX-Step [71] to single-step through the victim. After each instruction, he
uses the multifaceted side channels to record the address of the last instruction with the
given granularity (64 bytes in our case). The attacker gathers all these observations into a
trace of the victim’s execution. All remaining steps of the attack can be performed off-line
using the trace.
In order to extract control-flow information from the trace, the attacker converts it into a
dynamic control-flow graph (DCFG) [87] (line 3). The set of vertices of the DCFG is the
set of unique addresses from the trace. There is a directed edge from vertex v to vertex w if
and only if there is a transition from address v to address w.
The attacker’s goal is to establish a mapping between the vertices of DCFG t (i.e., ad-
dresses of unknown code units) and the known code units in the binary P . This randomized
27
mapping is produced by the ASLR algorithm. The attack builds the mapping in two steps.
First, the attacker generates several DCFGs for which he knows the mapping by running
program binary P himself with a known memory layout and known inputs, gathering an
execution trace (line 6) and converting the trace into a DCFG (line 7). Second, the attacker
tries to find a graph isomorphism between DCFG t and at least one of the DCFGs he gener-
ated in line 6 and for which he knows the mapping between code units and layout addresses.
By composing these two mappings, the attacker reconstructs the randomized ASLR layout.
The rest of this section provides more detail on DCFG construction (build_DCFG) and
matching (match_DCFGs).
DCFG construction. The construction of the basic DCFG from a trace is evident from
the definition. The procedure processes the trace in linear order. Every time the procedure
encounters a new address, it adds the address to the set of vertices of the DCFG. Every time
the procedure observes an address v followed directly by a different address w in the trace,
it adds a directed edge (v, w) to the edge set of the DCFG if that edge does not already exist.
Our DCFG construction procedure, build_DCFG , augments this basic construction with
additional information from the trace and encodes the information as vertex and edge labels.
The information includes: 1. Given the observation that the basic DCFGs tend to have
many linear chains (linear sequences of nodes with in- and out-degree one), build_DCFG
replaces every linear chain by a single directed edge and labels that contain the length of the
chain; 2. build_DCFG computes the order in which the addresses first appear in the trace.
This is effectively the order in which the basic DCFG construction procedure adds vertices
to the vertex set. The procedure adds the rank of each address in this order as a label to the
corresponding DCFG vertex. The procedure also adds a similar label for each edge in the
DCFG; 3. build_DCFG computes the relative frequency of each address in the trace and
adds this number as a label to the corresponding DCFG vertex. The procedure also adds a
similar edge label for transition frequency.
DCFG matching. Abstractly, our problem of matching two DCFGs is closely related to
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the graph isomorphism problem [88] for which no polynomial-time algorithm is known.
However, our concrete problem differs from standard graph isomorphism in several critical
ways. Importantly, we have additional data for the vertices and edges in our DCFGs that
simplify the problem significantly. Such data include the relative frequency with which
individual vertices and edges appear in the trace and their order of first appearance in the
trace. In addition, our graph isomorphism problem is approximate in two ways. The two
graphs may not be completely isomorphic since different inputs may have sent the two
executions along somewhat different paths. Furthermore, the attacker does not require a
complete isomorphism. A correct matching between a reasonably large number of vertices
may provide him with plenty of gadgets. These properties also distinguish our problem from
previous work that performs the CFG matching in the context of malware detection [89, 90,
91, 92]. These papers try to find tiny signatures inside a large CFG and rely critically on
information (instructions in CFG nodes) that is not available to our attacker.
Given the idiosyncratic nature of our problem, we design our own DCFG matching
algorithm. We model our problem as a constrained optimization problem and use a simple
heuristic to find an approximate solution. While more powerful and elegant algorithms may
well exist, this simple scheme is sufficient for our attack.
Given two directed graphs G = (V,E) and Ḡ = (V̄ , Ē), we are looking for a set
I = {(e1, ē1), (e2, ē2), . . .} of edge pairings such that ei ∈ E, ēi ∈ Ē (for i = 1, 2, . . .) that
is of maximal size and satisfies the following condition:
Condition 1 (Graph structure preservation): If (ei, ēi), (ej, ēj) ∈ I and ei and ej (ēi and
ēj) are neighboring edges (i.e., edges that have a vertex in common) then ēi and ēj (ei and
ej) must have the corresponding vertex in common.
The condition guarantees that the edge mapping I respects the graph structure of G and
Ḡ and that it is a bijection. In particular, no edge appears more than once in I .
Problems of this type can be approximated by various standard optimization algorithms
such as simulated annealing [93]. Our algorithm uses the following greedy heuristic. We
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define a confidence function c : E×Ē → IR that assigns a confidence value to each possible
pairing of edges from G and Ḡ. The confidence value is computed from the information
contained in the edge and vertex labels. More similar values between the labels of e and ē
result in a higher confidence score c(e, ē).
Algorithm 2 match_DCFGs
1: for all e ∈ E do
2: Cand(e) ={}
3: I ← {}
4: for all (e, ē) ∈ E × Ē do
5: if c(e, ē) > climit then
6: add ē to Cand(e)
7: repeat
8: I ← I ∪ {(e, ē)|e ∈ E and Cand(e) = {ē}}
9: while I violates Condition 1 do
10: Remove (e, ē) from I , where (e, ē) is the conflicting pairing with the lowest
confidence value
11: Remove all elements from the candidate lists that are inconsistent with I
12: until no new edge pairings
Algorithm 2 summarizes the scheme. The algorithm maintains a candidate list Cand(e)
for each edge e ∈ E, which is initialized to the set of edges ē ∈ Ē for which the confidence
score c(e, ē) exceeds the threshold climit. The algorithm also maintains the partial edge
mapping I which is initialized to the empty set. The main loop adds edge pairings to I for
all edges e ∈ E that have a unique partner in Ē (i.e., Cand(e) = {ē}). This indiscriminate
addition of edge pairings to I may result in a violation of Condition 1. The next step is
to remove pairings that cause inconsistencies from I until I satisfies Condition 1 again
(line 10). After that, the algorithm prunes the candidate lists to remove all candidates that are
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inconsistent with the current edge pairings in I (line 11). This process is repeated until no
new edge pairings can be added to I . Each edge pairing in I matches not only the two pairs
of vertices that make up the two edges, but also all vertices in the linear chains represented
by the edges.
The intuition behind the algorithm is that the additional data contained in the vertex
and edge labels allows us to establish an initial, small set of edge pairings that are typically
correct. Once the algorithm has a correct edge pairing, the search space for the neighboring
edges is vastly reduced from almost |E| to the in- or out-degrees of the two vertices that
make up the paired edge. This reduction is captured in the pruning of the candidate lists.
Effectively, the algorithm starts with a small number of seed pairings and grows I outwards
from there by repeatedly pairing edges that are neighbors of edges that are already paired.
This simple greedy heuristic requires most of the pairing decisions to be correct in order to
work well. This has been the case in our experience. In situations where this is not the case,
a variant of the algorithm that allows for backtracking may be required.
3.4 Mitigation against Attacks on Layout Generation
In this section, we introduce our defense system, dubbed SGX-Armor, that embodies a new
mitigation against the attacks on layout generation. We discuss the possible mitigation and
their limitations against our runtime attack in §3.7.
3.4.1 Secure Layout Generation
This section describes our algorithm for producing a randomized layout for the enclave
program in the presence of a strong adversary who can observe all memory accesses as
well as the outcomes of all conditional branches. We show that the algorithm leaks no
information about the randomized layout to that adversary. In addition to producing a
random permutation of the code units, our algorithm has to adjust all absolute and relative














































Figure 3.2: An example of a switching network with input size 8. The number of rounds is 3. The
number of switches per round is 4.
Algorithm 3 OSWAP (a1, a2, b) Variable b = 0 b = 1
0 : Load X, Y from a1, a2
1 : B64 = 0− b B64 {0}64 {1}64
2 : notB64 = ¬B64 notB64 {1}64 {0}64
3 : 0orX = X ∧B64 0orX {0}64 X
4 : Y or0 = Y ∧ notB64 Y or0 Y {0}64
5 : Y ′ = 0orX ∨ Y or0 Y ′ Y X
6 : Xor0 = X ∧ notB64 Xor0 X {0}64
7 : 0orY = Y ∧B64 0orY {0}64 Y
8 : X ′ = Xor0 ∨ 0orY X ′ X Y
9 : Store X ′, Y ′ to a1, a2
chosen permutation without leaking information about the latter. To ensure these security
requirements, our algorithm assumes fixed-size code units.
Oblivious swap (OSWAP). Our algorithm relies on a primitive (OSWAP) that works as
follows. Given two code unit addresses a1, a2 that are known to the attacker and a random
bit b that is not known to the attacker, oswap(a1, a2, b) will swap code units at a1 and a2 if
b = 1. If b = 0, it will leave the code units unchanged. In either case, oswap(a1, a2, b) will
produce identical sequences of attacker-observable events (i.e., branches, memory accesses).
Algorithm 3 shows our implementation of oswap(a1, a2, b) for a fixed data length given
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by the register size (8 bytes on x64). Longer data lengths can be accommodated by repeating
the operation on subsequent 8-byte segments. Line 0 loads the content of addresses a1
and a2 to variables X and Y . Line 1 extends the one bit of b to all 64 bits of the variable
B64, and line 2 stores the bitwise complement of B64 in another variable notB64. Line 3
computes the bitwise AND of X and B64. Line 4 does the analogous operation for Y and
notB64. Next, line 5 computes the first output Y ′ by combining the results of lines 3 and 4
using bitwise OR. Effectively, the first five lines implement the following if-statement: IF
b == 0 THEN Y ′ = Y ELSE Y ′ = X . Lines 6 through 8 perform the analogous operations
for the second output X ′. Finally, line 9 stores the outputs X ′ and Y ′ to the addresses a1 and
a2. We implemented an optimized version of this pseudocode using 15 lines of assembly
code and three extra 64-bit CPU registers.
The sequence of memory accesses (lines 0 and 9) is clearly independent of b. Further-
more, in contrast to the oblivious compare-and-swap function from [94] which uses the
cmov instruction and thus might leak secret information through microarchitectural channels,
OSWAP uses only bitwise logic instructions and an integer subtraction and contains no
conditionals at all. This makes OSWAP immune to a much broader class of side channels
than those listed in §3.2.3, including channels with sub-cache-line granularity such as Mem-
Jam [35]. As long as bitwise not, and, or and xor as well integer subtraction do not leak
the values of their operands, OSWAP is safe from all side channels.
Random permutation. If a single OSWAP operation does not leak information then any
fixed sequence of OSWAP operations will be similarly side-channel resistant. Thus, we can
use sequences of OSWAP operations to generate a random permutation of the code units in a
side-channel-resistant way.
A series of results shows that sequences of OSWAP operations can rapidly produce an
almost random permutation [95, 96, 97, 98, 74]. The high-level idea is to use an OSWAP-like
operation as a switch and construct a switching network (see Figure 3.2 for an example). A



































Figure 3.3: A: The switching network (blue arrows) permutes the code units (labeled 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 on
the left). B: The table π maps initial positions to final positions. C: Running the switching network
backwards (green arrows). The output array equals to the table π.
produce near uniformly distributed permutations over n input elements. In other words, after
O(n log n) OSWAP operations on appropriately chosen code unit addresses, the program (a
sequence of n code units) will be close to a random permutation. This should be sufficient
for ASLR. Note that permuting n code units in a larger region can be achieved by treating
extra space as dummy code units.
Relocations. In general, the program’s instructions will contain relative and absolute
addresses that have to be adjusted based on the permutation. The challenge is to do so
without leaking information about the permutation to the adversary. If the adjustments are
performed on the permuted program layout, the code that adjusts the addresses has to be
very carefully crafted to avoid leaking information about the permuted layout. Adjustments
require reading and writing operands in the program, and these memory accesses can be
observed by the adversary. For this reason, we adjust addresses on the original program
layout before permuting the code units. This requires knowledge of the permutation in order
to compute the correct relative and absolute addresses. An address a of a code unit can be
calculated as
a = base+ s× i, (3.1)
where base is the base address of the code region, s is the size of a code unit, and i is the
index of the s-byte slot in which the code unit resides. According to Equation 3.1, knowing
an index i is sufficient for computing the address of an code unit.
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We construct a table π that stores the position of each code unit will have under the final
permutation. Figure 3.3 shows an example. Figure 3.3a shows how the network (represented
by the blue arrows) permutes the code units. Figure 3.3b shows the corresponding table π.
π(i) is the position of the i-th code unit after the permutation (represented by the target of
the corresponding blue arrow). Unfortunately, simply running our network will produce
the right-hand side of Figure 3.3a and not table π. The key insight is that we can compute
table π by running our switching network backwards as shown in Figure 3.3c. The network
has the same arrows. However, their direction is reversed (from right to left). The input
(right-hand side) is the sequence of array positions (1, 2, . . . ). Input i is moved to position
π(i) in the output array (left-hand side). The output array is identical to the table π.
To run the network backwards, we execute the switches of the original network, but in
reverse order (i.e., from right to left in Figure 3.2). Each switch is fed the same random bit
as in the original network. This requires remembering the entire random bit sequence and
being able to access it in reverse order. The implementation could store the entire sequence
in memory. However, more space-efficient options exist. This computation of π does not
leak secret information by the same argument used for the original switching network. We
are using the same network, except that we are executing it in reverse order.
Given table π and Equation 3.1, the absolute and relative addresses can be easily
computed. We describe an example for a relative address as follows. Assume code units ci
and cj originally reside in the i-th and the j-th slots. The code unit ci contains a relocatable
address dst at offset f . The target of the relocatable address is within code unit cj at offset
g. With the help of π, we can compute the relative address under the permuted layout for
dst as
dst = (base+ π(j)× s+ g)− (base+ π(i)× s+ f). (3.2)
Equation 3.2 shows that, once having the table π, the loader can perform the relocation
process before permuting the code units. More importantly, the order of the process remains
the same (i.e., follow the order on the relocation table). The attacker who knows the
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relocation table (because the binary is public) cannot learn extra information about the
randomized layout. Critically, secret information from table π is only used in the arithmetic
operations of Equation 3.2. The accesses to table π are fixed and determined completely by
the order of the relocation table entries, which is known to the attacker. Each calculation
involves two lookups in table π (π(i) and π(j)). Both i and j depend only on the binary, but
not on information read from π. The secret values read from π are used only in a subtraction,
an addition, a multiplication, and a store to memory (as the value being stored, not as the
address). Our hardware model assumes that these operations do not leak information to the
attacker. The argument for absolute addresses is similar.
3.5 Implementation
In this section, we describe our attack framework, and show how we used it to carry out the
attacks on SGX-Shield. Finally, we describe the implementation of SGX-Armor in detail.
3.5.1 Automated Attack Analysis Framework
The input to the framework is a trace of the memory accesses of a program of the kind that
fine-grained cache- and page-table-based attacks against SGX can recover. The purpose
of the framework is to perform various common processing steps on the trace. As men-
tioned earlier, we did not implement the physical side channels. Instead, we collected the
traces of the programs’ memory operations using GDB [99], a widely used debugger. We
implemented the framework in python with 1,750 lines of code. It consists of the following
components.
1 Side-channel modeler. The modeler applies models of side-channels to the collected
trace. To model a cache-based side channel, we extract a cache-granular trace such that
the address of each memory access in the trace has only bits 6-11. Moreover, we remove
consecutive accesses with the same values for these bits. Similarly, to model a page-table-
based side channel, we remove bits 0-11 from all addresses.
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2 Layout generation attack analyzer. The analyzer implements the attacks on loading
and relocation, as outlined in §3.3.1. For the attack on loading, the analyzer requires
additional information, including the original position of each code unit in the binary, the
base address of the binary within the enclave, and the memory range to which the loader
copies the code units. For the attack on relocation, the analyzer also requires the information
of the relocation table.
3 Runtime attack analyzer. The analyzer realizes the attack described in §3.3.2. For the
DCFG construction, the analyzer takes a side-channel trace generated from the side-channel
modeler as an input and builds a DCFG based on the trace. For DCFG matching, the
analyzer takes two DCFGs as inputs and performs the matching algorithm.
3.5.2 Attacks against SGX-Shield
Overview. The implementation of SGX-Shield consists of two components: a customized
LLVM compiler and an in-enclave loader. The compiler partitions the executable into code
units of constant size (32 or 64 bytes) such that the in-enclave loader can easily position
each code unit at a different random memory location. This transformation places a jump
instruction at the end of each code unit to transfer control to the next code unit. The compiler
also adds symbol and relocation information that allow the loader to find the code units
and to update absolute and relative addresses. At enclave creation time, the loader and
the application binary are placed inside the enclave. The enclave also contains 32 MB
of memory space for the randomized code layout. When the enclave starts running, the
loader generates a randomized layout for the application binary by placing each code unit
independently into a random (32- or 64-byte aligned) location within the 32 MB reserved
space (the loading phase). Finally, it fixes up all relative and absolute addresses and transfers
control to the application (the relocation phase).
Implementation of loading in SGX-Shield. Figure 3.4 shows the relevant code snippet
of the implementation of loading. For each code unit in the table symtab, the function picks
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1 static void load(void) {
2 for (unsigned i = 1; i < n_symtab; ++i, ++_n_symtab) {
3 Elf64_Addr symoff = pshdr[symtab[i].st_shndx].sh_offset
4 + symtab[i].st_value;
5 ...




10 ⋆ cpy((char *)symtab[i].st_value,
11 ⋆ GET_OBJ(char, symoff), symtab[i].st_size);
12 }
13 }
Figure 3.4: The code snippet of loading in SGX-Shield.
a randomized address from the reserved space (line 6-8). Next, the function copies the
code unit from its original location (with the offset symoff to the base address of the binary
within the enclave) to the randomized one (line 10-11).
Attack on loading. The memory accesses involved in cpy() provide the necessary pattern
that the attack needs to infer the randomized address of a code unit. To implement the attack,
we collect a runtime log of the loading phase and extract a trace of memory accesses with
both page- and cache-granular information (i.e., bits 6-63 of each address are known) using
the side-channel modeler. To identify the randomized addresses of the code units in the
trace, the information we provide to the layout generation attack analyzer includes the base
address of the binary inside the enclave, the offset of each code unit to the base address,
which allows the analyzer to know each of symoff, the base address of the reserved space,
and also its size (32 MB).
Attack on loading. During the loading phase, the loader iterates through all the code units.
For each code unit, the loader picks a randomized address from the reserved space and
copies the code unit from its original location to the randomized one. The memory accesses
involved in the copy operation provide the necessary pattern that the attack needs to infer the
randomized address of a code unit. To implement the attack, we collect a runtime log of the
loading phase and extract a trace of memory accesses with both page- and cache-granular
information using the side-channel modeler. To identify the randomized addresses of the
code units in the trace, the information we provide to the layout generation attack analyzer
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1 static void relocate(void) {
2 for (unsigned k = 0; k < n_rel; ++k)
3 for (unsigned i = 0; i < n_reltab[k]; ++i) {
4 unsigned int ofs = REL_DST_OFS(reltab[k][i].r_offset);
5 unsigned int dst_sym = REL_DST_NDX(reltab[k][i].r_offset);
6 addr_t dst = (addr_t)symtab[dst_sym].st_value + (addr_t)ofs;
7 ...
8 if (type == R_X86_64_64) {
9 ⋆ *(addr_t *)dst =
10 ⋆ symtab[src_sym].st_value + reltab[k][i].r_addend;
11 } else if (type == R_X86_64_32) {
12 ⋆ *(uint32_t*)dst =
13 ⋆ (uint32_t)(symtab[src_sym].st_value+reltab[k][i].r_addend);
14 } else if (type == R_X86_64_32S) {
15 ⋆ *(int32_t*)dst = (int32_t)(symtab[src_sym].st_value
16 ⋆ + reltab[k][i].r_addend);
17 } else if (type == R_X86_64_PC32||type == R_X86_64_PLT32) {
18 ⋆ *(uint32_t*)dst = (uint32_t)(symtab[src_sym].st_value
19 ⋆ - dst + reltab[k][i].r_addend);
20 } else if (type == R_X86_64_GOTPCREL) {
21 ⋆ *(uint32_t*)dst =
22 ⋆ (uint32_t)((uint64_t)&(symtab[src_sym].st_value)




Figure 3.5: The code snippet of relocation in SGX-Shield.
includes the base address of the binary inside the enclave, the offset of each code unit to the
base address, the base address of the reserved space, and also its size.
Implementation of relocation in SGX-Shield. Figure 3.5 shows the relevant code snippet
of the implementation of relocation. The function iterates through the relocation table
reltab. After getting information from the table reltab, the function calculates the correct
value and updates the relocatable address to which dst points (line 9-10, 12-13, 15-16,
18-19, and 21-23).
Attack on relocation. The parts of the implementation that are vulnerable to the attack
include the memory accesses to reltab and dst. We use the same granularity of side-
channel traces as we used in the loading attack. We provide the base address and the size of
both reltab and the reserved space to the analyzer.
Attack on relocation. During the relocation phase, the loader iterates through the relocation
table. For each of the entry on the table, the loader obtains the target address points to the
relocatable address, calculates the correct value, and writes the value to the target address.
39
The parts of the implementation that are vulnerable to the attack include the memory accesses
to the relocation table and the target address. We use the same granularity of side-channel
traces as we used in the loading attack. We provide the base address and the size of both the
relocation table and the reserved space to the analyzer.
Runtime derandomization attack. To conduct the attack, we obtain the same granularity
of runtime traces from a program with randomized layout and analyze the traces using
the runtime attack analyzer. Because the attack does not depend on the implementation of
SGX-Shield, we do not need to provide additional information to the analyzer.
3.5.3 SGX-Armor Prototype
1 oswapq:
2 movq (%rdi), %rax
3 movq (%rsi), %rcx
4 neg %rdx
5 movq %rax, %r9
6 andq %rdx, %r9
7 not %rdx
8 andq %rcx, %rdx
9 orq %rdx, %r9
10 xorq %rcx, %rax
11 xorq %r9, %rax
12 movq %r9, %rcx
13 movq %rax, (%rdi)
14 movq %rcx, (%rsi)
15 ret
Figure 3.6: The implementation of OSWAP for two 64-bit inputs.
We implemented the prototype of SGX-Armor on top of SGX-Shield by replacing the
layout and relocation code of its loader with the proposed, secure alternatives: OSWAP and
random permutation. Our prototype used 32-byte code units.
OSWAP. We implemented OSWAP in 40 lines of assembly code, which follows the standard
Unix 64-bit calling convention. The implementation includes a function that supports a
single swap of two 64-bit operands as shown inFigure 3.6. The function uses registers rdi,
rsi, rdx to hold the parameters a1, a2, b, respectively. In addition, the function uses three
extra registers (rax, rcx, and r9) for storing the intermediate values of the algorithm. To
support 32-byte code units, we provide a function with a loop that executes a series of the
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64-bit swap.
Random permutation. The implementation of the algorithm consists of two phases:
initialization and permutation. The initialization phase, which can be done offline, generates
a random switching network. As previous work [74] has proved that almost every switching
network generates an almost random permutation, a random switching network is sufficient
for ASLR. Alternately, we could have used one of several explicit constructions [74, 100]
with slightly different bounds. We chose to use a random switching network for ease of
implementation. The permutation phase first generates a random bit (using rdrand) for each
of switch and stores it in an array. Next, it applies the switching network to the code units
and finally outputs the randomly permuted layout.
To secure the process of the relocation, we update the relocatable addresses before
permuting the code units, as outlined in §3.4.1. To run the backward switching network,
we execute the switches in reverse order using the random bits stored in the array. The
permutation scheme is implemented by adding 863 lines of code to SGX-Shield’s loader.
Safeguard code pages. To guarantee that the code pages are both non-writable and non-
readable to the application after the layout generation, we use the same mechanism, software
data execution protection (DEP), as SGX-Shield [14] does. This mechanism is not needed
for SGX version 2 which supports modification of page permissions [101] by the enclave
and which appears to have just become commercially available [102].
3.6 Evaluation
In this section, we present our evaluation results with the goal of answering the following
questions.
• Is SGX-Shield vulnerable to the layout generation attacks?
• How effective is the runtime attack against SGX-Shield?
• What is the performance impact of SGX-Armor?
Experimental setup. The experiment was carried out on a machine with a 4-core Intel
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i7-6700K CPU (Skylake) operating at 4.00 GHz with 64 GB of RAM. The machine ran
Linux kernel 4.8. Each core had private 32 KB L1 and 256 KB L2 caches, and all cores
shared an 8 MB L3 cache. All SGX applications were compiled with clang (based on
customized LLVM 4.0.0 for supporting ASLR) and executed on top of the Intel Linux SGX
SDK 2.1.102.
Target applications. In our experiments, we selected three applications and ported them
to the SGX environment. The applications included an image compressor, a database, and a
web server that were built on top of real-world, open-source projects. The image compressor
is based on Libjpeg [77], a library for processing JPEG images, that had been chosen as
the target of side-channel attacks in previous work [3, 17, 8]. For the database and the
web server, we used SQLite3 [75], a popular SQL database engine, and, Lighttpd [76], a
widely used web server. Both the database and the web server are commonly used in web
applications and therefore would benefit from software defense mechanisms such as ASLR.
3.6.1 Attacking Layout Generation
This section examines how vulnerable SGX-Shield is to the layout generation attack we
describe in §3.5.2. We ran the attack against the loader of SGX-Shield while it loaded
each of our target applications. To estimate the impact of the code unit size, we ran our
experiments for both 64- and 32-byte code units. For each of the settings, we ran each of the
applications three times and report the averages over the three runs.
We present the results in terms of the fraction of code units from the binary for which
the attack obtains the correct randomized address. We denote this fraction as the layout
derandomization rate (DRR). The resolution of the cache side channel is inherently limited to
64-byte cache lines. Thus, we count a code unit as correctly identified if the attack finds
the aligned 64-byte address range in which it resides. This makes no difference for 64-byte
code units since there is only one way to place a 64-byte code unit into an aligned 64-byte
address range. However, for 32-byte code units there are two possible aligned placements
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Table 3.2: The results of initial layout attacks on target applications.
Attacks on loading Attacks on relocation
Application 64-byte unit 32-byte unit 64-byte unit 32-byte unit
#units DRR #units DRR #units DRR #units DRR
Libjpeg 4,756 100% 10,733 100% 4,606 96.8% 10,497 97.8%
Lighttpd 7,350 100% 16,105 100% 6,982 95.0% 15,455 96.0%
SQLite 14,851 100% 32,491 100% 14,097 94.9% 31,283 96.3%
Average 100% 100% 95.6% 96.7%
Table 3.3: The entropy averaged on the three target applications under different ASLR schemes.
base: baseline entropy. loading, relocation, runtime: entropy left after each of the corresponding
attack.
base loading relocation runtime
SGX-Shield 64-byte 19.00 0.00 0.84 0.96
SGX-Shield 32-byte 20.00 1.00 1.63 6.23
SGX-Armor 32-byte 20.00 20.00 20.00 6.23
(at offset 0 and at offset 32) within an aligned 64-byte address range, and the attacker will
have to resolve the remaining bit of uncertainty as outlined in §3.2.3.
Results. Table 3.2 shows the results. For 64-byte code units, the attack on loading identifies
all the code units of each target application. The attack on relocation identifies more than
95% of the code units. This number is below 100% because not all code units contain
relocatable addresses. However, the attack identified 100% of the code units that contain
relocatable addresses. For 32-byte code units, Table 3.2 shows that the attacks are as
effective as in the 64-byte case. However, as explained above, the attacker is left with one
bit of uncertainty, as the attack cannot determine if a code unit is placed at offset 0 or 32
within the 64-byte address range.
Entropy analysis. Table 3.3 displays the entropy averaged over all code units. The baseline
entropy is determined by the size of reserved space (32 MB) and the size of code units. The
results show that for 64-byte code units, the loading attack completely removes the entropy
(i.e., becomes 0) because the attack identified all the code units. Using smaller code units
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Table 3.4: The results of the runtime attack on target applications.
SGX-Shield 64-byte unit SGX-Shield 32-byte unit
Application Test case #units DRR FDR #units DRR FDR
Libjpeg 100x100 image 1,010 96.1% 0.5% 2,187 89.4% 2.2%
200x200 image 996 97.4% 0.0% 2,159 77.1% 2.1%
300x300 image 992 94.5% 0.5% 2,164 79.1% 2.8%
Lighttpd HTML 1,946 94.6% 0.3% 4,391 62.7% 5.7%
IMG 1,964 94.1% 0.8% 4,339 68.8% 5.0%
CSS 1,958 94.0% 1.7% 4,394 57.0% 6.1%
Javascript 1,952 97.1% 0.6% 4,357 70.6% 4.0%
SQLite create 3,711 98.5% 0.1% 8,190 83.2% 5.8%
insert 3,322 91.0% 1.5% 7,279 75.3% 6.7%
update 3,532 93.6% 1.7% 7,966 76.5% 7.1%
select 3,071 96.0% 0.9% 6,696 78.1% 7.3%
delete 3,468 92.6% 1.2% 7,645 79.2% 5.7%
Average 94.9% 0.8% 76.3% 5.0%
(32-bytes) only provides 1 bit of randomness after the attack. For the relocation attack,
although the number of code units that have relocatable addresses is smaller than the total
number of code units, the results show a similar entropy reduction. The reason lies in the
branch instruction that SGX-Shield inserts at the end of almost all the code units, which is
relocatable. Finally, the results show that, by using SGX-Armor, the entropy remains the
same as the baseline value because SGX-Armor is immune to the layout generation attack.
3.6.2 Attacking Runtime Randomization
The goal of this section is to evaluate how effective the runtime attack is against the fine-
grained ASLR layout produced by SGX-Shield. We applied the runtime attack from §3.5.2
against all three target applications. For the image compressor, we used a 100x100 image as
an input seed to get a baseline DCFG and a 100x100, a 200x200, and a 300x300 image to
get target DCFGs. For the database application, we collected baseline DCFGs by separately
executing create, insert, update, select, and delete operations. We collected target DCFGs
by executing different sequences of these operations with distinct input parameters (i.e.,
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operating on different databases). For the web server, we constructed DCFGs based on the
executions of serving an HTML page, an image, a CSS file, and a JavaScript file. For the
target DCFGs, we requested the files with the same types but distinct content. We executed
each application with both 64- and 32-byte code units using SGX-Shield. We present the
results in terms of layout derandomization rates (DRR) and false detection rates (FDR), which
represent the fractions of correctly and falsely matched vertices out of all vertices of a target
DCFG, respectively. For each of the settings, we ran each of the applications three times
and report the averages over the three runs. We built the ground truth using debugging
information. Similar to the layout generation attack, we also show the results in terms of
entropy.
Results. Table 3.4 presents the results. For the case of SGX-Shield with 64-byte code
units, the attack successfully identified nearly all the code units through DCFG matching
(DRR=94.9%). This indicates that the algorithm effectively captures common behavior across
different executions. The case of SGX-Shield with 32-byte code units introduced noise
to the attack, which not only reduced DRR (to 76.3%) but also increased FDR. The likely
explanation lies in the fact that some of the code units share their 64-byte address range
with a second code unit. As result, the attacker is only able to observe the union of the
transitions into and out of the two unknown code units. However, DRR is still quite high,
which indicates that this situation is rare. The reason lies in the size of the reserved space is
much larger than the size of total code units.
Entropy analysis. Table 3.3 displays the entropy averaged over all the code units observed
during the runtime of the three applications. The results show that the case of SGX-Shield
with 64-byte code units has almost no entropy after the attack. For SGX-Shield with 32-byte
code units, the attack reduces the entropy from 20 to about 6 bits. The still considerable
entropy of 6 bits is almost entirely the result of the fact that the attack failed to derandomize
about 25% of the code units. For each of the 76.3% (DRR) of the units that were successfully
derandomized, the residual entropy is only 1 bit (due to the 64-bit limit on address resolution).
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Table 3.5: The load-time performance of SGX-Armor.
Layout generation time Memory requirement
Application baseline SGX-Armor baseline SGX-Armor
Libjpeg 1.91 ms 3.34 ms 343 KB 609 KB
Lighttpd 3.31 ms 5.34 ms 515 KB 698 KB
SQLite 6.44 ms 11.36 ms 1,039 KB 1,911 KB
Table 3.6: The results of running nbench SGX-Armor.
Application baseline SGX-Shield SGX-Armor
Num sort 951 µs 1.43% 1.34% (−0.09%)
String sort 5,932 µs 35.12% 35.33% (+0.21%)
Fp emu. 9,061 µs 6.78% 6.26% (−0.52%)
Assignment 36,205 µs 0.61% 0.89% (+0.28%)
Idea 291 µs 0.09% 0.03% (−0.06%)
Huffman 334 µs 24.73% 24.80% (+0.07%)
Neural net 21,596 µs 26.69% 26.95% (+0.26%)
Lu decomp. 795 µs 3.22% 3.23% (+0.01%)
Average 12.33% 12.35% (+0.02%)
Thus, the average entropy of 6 bits may not offer much protection, as an attacker may find
plenty of gadgets in the 76.3% of the code units. For SGX-Armor with 32-byte code units,
the entropy reduction is the same as the case of SGX-Shield with 32-byte code units. This
indicates that SGX-Armor produces similar layout as SGX-Shield does and therefore is also
vulnerable to the attack.
3.6.3 Overhead of SGX-Armor
The goal of this section is to demonstrate that SGX-Armor is practical. We evaluate the
effect of SGX-Armor on both program load time and runtime. SGX-Armor adopts a code
unit size of 32 bytes. For the load-time evaluation, we measure the time SGX-Armor takes
to generate the layout. We use the time of loading the binary without permutation as the
baseline. We also show the amount of memory SGX-Armor requires. We use the size of
the code section in the binary as the baseline. For the runtime evaluation, we use the same
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set of benchmark programs [103] used to evaluate SGX-Shield [14] and measure the time
SGX-Armor takes to finish a program run. We obtained the baseline by directly porting
the benchmark programs to SGX and measuring the execution time of each program (i.e.,
without instrumentation and ASLR). For comparison, we also reproduced the results of
SGX-Shield with 32-byte code units. We show the overheads of both SGX-Shield and
SGX-Armor as a percentage of the baseline. We collected the results of both load-time and
runtime evaluations from ten independent runs and reported the averages over these results.
Results. Table 3.5 displays the results of the load-time evaluation for our three target
applications. The impact of SGX-Armor on program startup time is less than 12 ms in
all cases and is thus negligible. The memory requirements of SGX-Armor are noticeably
larger than the baseline numbers. However, they are still small when compared to the total
size of enclave memory (∼100 MB). Importantly, all extra memory used by SGX-Armor is
released by the time the application starts running. Thus, SGX-Armor has no impact on the
memory available to running applications.
Table 3.6 shows the runtime performance. The runtime overhead of SGX-Armor over
the baseline is only 12.35% averaged over the benchmark programs. The overhead comes
mostly from the need to execute additional jump instructions at the end of each code unit.
Compared to the results of SGX-Shield which executes the same number of extra jump
instructions, SGX-Armor has negligible overhead (0.02% difference). This shows that
SGX-Armor improves the security of layout generation over SGX-Shield without imposing
additional runtime overheads.
3.7 Discussion: Mitigation against Runtime Attacks
We have shown in §3.6.1 that attackers who monitor the page-table- and cache-based side
channels can completely derandomize the fine-grained ASLR layout generated by SGX-
Shield. As discussed in §3.3.1, this is not just an implementation deficiencyagainst of
SGX-Shield, but the result of the memory accesses of typical ASLR systems, which can be
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observed through side channels. As we show in §3.4.1, layout generation can be protected
against all the known side channels.
§3.6.2 showed that, by simply observing the combination of page- and cache-line-
granular addresses of the executed instructions, the adversary can reconstruct DCFG and use
it to identify the locations of a large part of the code units. On the other hand, the results also
indicated that using code units that are smaller than the side-channel resolution can affect
the accuracy of the reconstructed DCFG. Based on such observation, one simple mitigation
can be to pack the code units densely (e.g., force them to share cache lines) and thereby
obfuscating the reconstructed DCFG.
Unfortunately, it does not appear that this mitigation can provide general protection
against attacks based on runtime leakage. In our model, the attacker knows the code units
into which the ASLR system decomposes the binary; he just does not know their positions
in memory. However, using page-table- and cache-based side channels, he can observe the
addresses at which the enclave program executes instructions. Starting his observations
when the enclave program begins to execute, he will immediately identify the location of the
code unit that contains the program’s entry point. If that code unit contains no unpredictable
control-flow instructions, the adversary can follow program execution to the next code
unit and so forth. In the extreme case (straight-line programs without control flow that the
adversary cannot predict), the adversary can, thus, trivially derandomize the entire layout.
The same is true if the attacker can use a complete and noise-free branch-prediction side
channel. However, in general, this simple attack will break down because the attacker does
not know which control-flow path the application is taking.
Yet, this mitigation relies on a property of the program and not of the ASLR system.
Programs with simple DCFGs or whose DCFGs depend on data that the adversary can
predict appear to be inherently vulnerable to our runtime attack. Below, we discuss potential
defenses that lie outside our attacks and ASLR model.
Side-channel defenses. Several authors describe systems to mitigate certain SGX side
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channels [17, 20, 15]. Without the strong SGX-specific side channels, the attacker would
face a situation much closer to that faced by the traditional ASLR attackers. At present,
it is still unclear if this approach can provide a general protection, as the published side-
channel defenses, suffer from various limitations [20], have high overhead [15], or have
been followed up be new side-channel attacks that overcome the defenses [17].
Program transformations. The defender could try to apply program transformations be-
yond ASLR. For example, Pappas et al. [82] randomize the code itself, rather than its location
in memory. One could envision additional transformations to obfuscate or randomize the
DCFG. The challenge with such approaches is that the component performing the transfor-
mations would have to execute inside the enclave subject to side-channel observations by
the adversary. It appears challenging to design side-channel-resistant versions of these fairly
complex components. Our side-channel-resistant layout generator from §3.4 has to solve
a much simpler problem. In the presence of side-channel leakage, the transformations are
subject to being observed by the adversary.
Rerandomization. Another approach could be to frequently rerandomize the memory
layout [104, 105, 106, 107], either partially or completely. For example, one could interleave
OSWAP operations with program execution. It is still unclear, however, how frequently
the rerandomization would have to occur and what their security benefit and performance
impact would be.
3.8 Related Work
Attacks on ASLR. Strackx et al. [108] showed an attack against ASLR by exploiting
memory disclosure vulnerabilities in the program. Snow et al. [53] presented an attack
against fine-grained ASLR. The attack relies on a serious memory-disclosure vulnerability
that gives the attacker unrestricted read access to the victim’s address space. Our attacks do
not rely on such an assumption. Several authors attack ASLR using side channels [54, 30, 55,
56, 57]. These attacks target non-fine-grained ASLR in a traditional attack model. In contrast,
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this paper targets fine-grained ASLR in the SGX attack model that the attacker controls
the operating system. Recent work [30] speculates about the possibility of attacking fine-
grained ASLR with the branch-prediction side channel, but does not describe or demonstrate
a concrete attack.
Side-channel attacks against SGX. In addition to the attacks mentioned in §3.2.3, we
discuss the known multifaceted side-channel attacks against SGX. Schwarz et al. [109]
proposed an attack that combines the DRAM-based and the L3 cache side channels against
an enclave without ASLR. Recent speculative execution attacks [39, 38, 11] combine the
L1 cache side channels to infer the speculatively fetched memory content of an enclave. In
contrast, our attacks combine the page-table-based and the L1 cache side channels against
an enclave with fine-grained ASLR.
Oblivious swap operation. Ohrymenko et al. [94] described a primitive similar to OSWAP
that depends on cmov instruction while OSWAP does not. Further, their target applications
(machine learning algorithm) and the higher-level techniques employed are quite different
from ours.
Attacks against SGX-Shield. Recent work [110] demonstrated code-reuse attacks against
an enclave under the protection of SGX-Shield. The attacks exploit a limitation of SGX-
Shield that does not randomize the code from Intel SDK. In contrast, our attacks do not
require such a limitation in an ASLR implementation.
Switching networks applications. Kwon et al. [111] used a switching network to protected
a messaging system against traffic-analysis attacks. Some authors [97, 98] used switching
networks for encrypting small-sized data. Our work utilizes switching networks to securely
produce randomized layout.
CFG matching. Several authors [89, 90, 92, 91] proposed to detect malware by searching
for small signatures (CFGs with only a few vertices) in the CFGs of large binaries. In
contrast to this line of work, our problem is to find an isomorphism between two large
DCFGs. Furthermore, the matching in all these results uses knowledge of the concrete
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instructions in each basic block. This information is not available to our side-channel
attacker who can only observe the addresses of executed instructions and only at limited
granularity. Finally, while these results match CFGs that were obtained though static analysis
of the binary, our attacker has to resort to dynamic analysis to obtain the victim’s DCFG.
Consequently, he has to cope with the incompleteness and input-dependence of this DCFG.
All this makes our problem quite different from previous work and requires a different
solution. Stacco [72] uses DCFGs to decide if slightly different inputs fed to the same binary
result in different control flow. This problem is quite different from ours. Our attacker has
to find an isomorphism between two DCFGs that were scrambled as a result of ASLR. In
contrast, Stacco has to decide if two DCFGs that should be obviously identical are different.
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CHAPTER 4
ERADICATING CONTROLLED-CHANNEL ATTACKS AGAINST ENCLAVE
PROGRAMS
4.1 Introduction
Hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have become one of the most
promising solutions against various security threats, including malware, remote exploits,
kernel exploits, hardware Trojans, and even malicious cloud operators [112]. ARM’s
TrustZone [61] and Samsung’s KNOX [113] are now widely deployed on mobile phones and
tablets. To secure traditional computing devices, such as laptops, desktops, and servers, the
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [114], Intel’s Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) [115],
and Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [116] have been developed and are being adopted
into mainstream products.
Among these hardware-based TEEs, Intel SGX is getting considerable attention because
it can be the basis for practical solutions in an important security domain: the trustworthy
public cloud, which provides strong guarantees of both confidentiality and integrity, which
are known to be the biggest obstacle to wider cloud adoption [112, 117]. Homomorphic
encryption [118] has been proposed as a software-only solution to this problem, but, so
far, it is too slow for practical uses. More critically, sensitive operations are often exe-
cuted on potentially malicious clients [119, 120, 121], which significantly weakens the
overall, end-to-end security of the system. In contrast, hardware-based Intel SGX pro-
vides strong security guarantees for running enclaves in combination with Intel’s efforts
on formal verification of the hardware specification and implementation of cryptographic
operations [122]. The resulting security guarantees enable a variety of new applications,
including data analytics [123], MapReduce [124], machine learning [94], Tor [125], Network
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Function Virtualization (NFV) [126], and library OSs [127, 128, 129].
However, researchers have recently demonstrated two critical side-channel attacks
against SGX programs, namely, page fault and cache-based side channels [3, 33, 130]. The
page fault attack, also known as the controlled-channel attack, is particularly dangerous
because it gives the malicious OS complete control over the execution of SGX programs. In
contrast, cache-based side-channel attacks have to passively, thus non-interactively, monitor
the execution from the outside. Specifically, to launch a controlled-channel attack, the
malicious OS can stop an enclave program, unmap the target memory pages, and simply
resume its execution. By using the leaked addresses, researchers [3] could reconstruct input
text and image files from running enclave programs [127]. Similarly, the pigeonhole [33]
attack could extract bits of encryption keys from cryptographic routines in OpenSSL and
libgcrypt.
Broadly, two types of countermeasures have been proposed, namely, obfuscating memory
accesses [131, 13, 33] and isolating page faults [33, 132], but both are limited in terms
of performance or compatibility. First, memory access obfuscation suffers from huge
performance degradation: up to 4000× overhead without significant developer effort [33].
Second, more efficient schemes, such as self-paging [132] and contractual execution [33],
require new page fault delivery mechanisms that do not exist in mainstream processors and
are unlikely to be included in them in the foreseeable future. For example, Intel considers
side-channel attacks as out of scope for SGX [122] and is unlikely to disrupt core processor
components to accommodate such proposals.
In this thesis work, we propose a new, practical enclave design, called T-SGX, that
can protect any enclave program against controlled-channel attacks using only existing
commodity hardware. At a high level, T-SGX transforms an enclave program such that any
exception or interrupt that occurs during the execution is redirected to one specific page
(see §4.4.2). We provide strong security guarantees against controlled-channel attacks under
a conservative threat model (see §4.6).
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T-SGX realizes this mechanism with a commodity hardware feature, called Intel Trans-
actional Synchronization Extensions (TSX), that was introduced with the Haswell processor.
The key enabling property of TSX is the way it aborts an ongoing transaction when encoun-
tering an erroneous situation, such as a page fault or interrupt. In particular, when a page
fault occurs, TSX immediately invokes a user-space fallback handler without notifying the
underlying OS. The fallback handler recognizes whether the very recent attempt to execute a
code page or access a data page has triggered a page fault. If it did, T-SGX carefully termi-
nates the program. Further, TSX ensures that such traps and exceptions are never exposed
to system software including the OS and hypervisor, implying that the controlled-channel
attack relying on page fault monitoring is no longer possible with T-SGX because even the
OS cannot know whether a page fault has occurred.
However, obtaining a working, efficient TSX-secured enclave binary requires careful
program analysis. First, TSX is very sensitive to cache usage; it treats cache conflicts and
evictions as errors [26, §15.3.8.2]. Thus, we have to carefully compose transactional code
regions based on their memory access patterns. Second, TSX treats any interrupts and
exceptions as errors (e.g., timer and I/O interrupts), so we cannot run a code region for
a long time even if it makes no memory accesses. Third, setting up a TSX transaction
is very expensive (around 200 cycles on our test machine with an Intel Core i7-6700K
4 GHz CPU). This creates a naïve solution, wrapping individual instructions with TSX,
impractical. Finally, we need to carefully arrange transactional code regions in memory to
hide transitions between them from attackers (see §4.4.2).
T-SGX is based on a modified LLVM compiler satisfying the following three important
design requirements. First, T-SGX automatically transforms a normal enclave program
into a secured version, all of whose code and data pages are wrapped with TSX. Second,
T-SGX isolates the specific page for the fallback handler and other transaction control
code, called springboard, from the original program’s code and data pages to ensure
that exceptions including page faults and timer interrupts can only be triggered on the
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springboard. The OS can identify whether an exception has occurred at the springboard,
but this does not reveal any meaningful information. Third, T-SGX ensures that there are
no unexpected transaction aborts due to benign errors (e.g., transaction buffer overflow and
timer interrupts), by carefully splitting a target enclave program into a number of small
execution blocks satisfying the TSX cache constraints. A conservative splitting strategy
(e.g., secure individual basic blocks) significantly slows down T-SGX (§4.7). We develop
compiler-level optimization techniques, such as loop optimizations and cache usage profiling,
to increase the size of execution blocks as much as possible for performance (§4.5).
Our evaluation results show the effectiveness of T-SGX in terms of security, compat-
ibility, and performance. First, we applied T-SGX to the three programs attacked by the
controlled-channel attack (JPEG, Hunspell, and FreeType) and confirmed that an attacker
was no longer able to obtain meaningful information and there was no compatibility issue.
We also checked the overall overhead of T-SGX with the programs. On average, the execu-
tion time increased by 40% and the memory consumption increased by 30%. Second, we
applied T-SGX to a popular benchmark suite, nbench, and confirmed that the performance
overhead of T-SGX was 50% on average.
In summary, this thesis work makes the following contributions:
• New security mechanism. We develop a new security mechanism, T-SGX, to
protect enclave programs from a serious threat: the controlled-channel attack. At
compilation time, it transforms an enclave program into a secure version without
requiring annotations or other manual developer efforts, and, most important, it does
not require hardware modifications.
• Novel usage of TSX. To the best of our knowledge, T-SGX is the first attempt to use
TSX to detect suspicious exceptions. Mimosa [133] was the first application of TSX
to establish a confidential memory region, but it focuses on detecting read-write or
write-write conflicts, which is the original use case of TSX. In contrast, we use TSX
to isolate exceptions such as page faults and redirect them to a user space handler
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under our control.
• Springboard and program analysis. It was believed that TSX should be applied
only to a small portion of a program due to its sensitivity to cache usage and interrupts.
Our springboard design and program analysis make a breakthrough: we can run any
program in transactions without compatibility problems.
• Evaluation and analysis. To evaluate its security, we applied T-SGX to previous
controlled-channel attack targets (i.e., libjpeg, Hunspell, and FreeType) and confirmed
a 40% performance overhead on average. To understand the performance in detail, we
also ported and ran a benchmark suite, called nbench: we observed a 50% performance
degradation on average. T-SGX is also easy to use; it was able to transform all our
macro- and micro-benchmarks with no source code modification.
4.2 Controlled-channel Attack Revisited
In this section, we briefly explain the controlled-channel attack [3] (called pigeonhole attack
in [33]) that allows a malicious OS to infer sensitive computation and data inside a TEE
such as Haven [127] and InkTag [134]. We limit the discussion to attacks against SGX,
which is the focus of this thesis work and which provides stronger security guarantees than
a trusted hypervisor (e.g., InkTag).
4.2.1 Threat Model
We explain the threat model of the controlled-channel attack. Note that our system, T-SGX,
assumes the same threat model.
First, the attack assumes that an OS can manage (e.g., map and unmap) enclave memory
pages although it cannot see their contents. Whenever an enclave program attempts to access
an unmapped page, the OS will receive a page fault to handle it; then the handler either
remaps the page and resumes the program or generates an access violation error. However,
this attack does not assume that the OS knows the exact offset of a page fault because TEEs
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can hide this information from the OS.
Second, the attack assumes that an attacker knows the detailed behavior of a target
enclave program, especially its memory access patterns according to inputs. The attacker
has already analyzed a target enclave program’s source code and/or binary in detail to
obtain the information. Also, this attack ignores programs with obfuscated memory access
patterns (e.g., Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [13, 135]) because they do not have visible behavior
characteristics.
Third, the attack assumes that an attacker cannot arbitrarily run a target enclave program.
Due to remote attestation, a user will know how many times his/her enclave program is
executed in the public cloud such that it is difficult to run the target enclave program many
times without the user’s approval.
Fourth, the attack relies only on a noise-free side channel: page fault information. Other
noisy side channels, including cache and memory bus, are out of the scope for this thesis
work.
4.2.2 Controlled-channel Attack
The controlled-channel attack uses page faults as a controllable side channel. Since a
malicious OS can manipulate the page table of an enclave program, it can know which
memory pages the enclave program wants to access by setting a reserved bit in page table
entries and monitoring page faults.
In contrast to a normal execution environment, the malicious OS cannot see the exact
faulting address but only the page frame number because SGX masks the exact address,
as explained in §2.2. To overcome this limitation, the controlled-channel attack analyzes
sequences of page faults rather than individual page faults.
The final step of the controlled-channel attack is correlating the page fault sequences
with the results of offline, in-depth analysis of a target enclave program. This allows the
attacker to infer the input to the enclave program if the memory access pattern of the program
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varies sufficiently with the input.
Effectiveness. The original controlled-channel attack was demonstrated against three
popular libraries: FreeType, Hunspell, and libjpeg. The evaluation results show that the
attack can accurately infer the input text and images to the libraries [3]. Shinde et al. [33]
use a similar attack to extract bits of cryptographic keys from the OpenSSL and libgcrypt
libraries.
4.2.3 Known Countermeasures
A few countermeasures against controlled-channel attacks have been discussed, but most of
them are neither practical nor secure. Intel has revised its SGX specification to support an
option for recording page faults and general protection faults in the SSA [116]. However, this
countermeasure is incomplete because a malicious OS can cause the SSA to be overwritten
(details in §4.2.4). Second, Intel has suggested static and dynamic analysis to eliminate all
feasible input-dependent code and data flows [122]. But, this requires significant developer
effort and incurs non-negligible performance overhead. Third, Shinde et al. [33] have
proposed deterministic multiplexing, a software-only solution against the controlled-channel
attack. However, its performance overhead is tremendous without developer-assisted opti-
mizations. Finally, Shinde et al. also have proposed a new execution model (contractual
execution) that makes a contract between the enclave program and the OS to ensure that a
specified number of memory pages reside in the enclave. Their proposal, however, requires
modifications to core processors components. Such changes appear difficult and unrealistic.
4.2.4 Overwriting Exit Reason
As mentioned in §2.2, the SSA stores the exit reason for each AEX. However, we found that
a malicious OS can easily overwrite the exit reason by sending an arbitrary interrupt to an
enclave program because the SSA stores only the last exit reason1. This makes an enclave
1There is an SSA stack for handling nested exceptions. However, this overwriting attack is not about nested
exceptions because it sends a new interrupt right after handling the previous interrupt.
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program unaware of page faults, even if it uses an option SECS.MISCSELECT.EXINFO=1 to
record page faults and general protection faults.
We experimentally confirmed that a malicious OS can overwrite the exit reason of a page
fault by using a fake general protection fault. When a page fault is generated, a corresponding
address is stored in SSA.MISC.EXINFO.MADDR and PFEC is stored in SSA.MISC.EXINFO.ERRCD
for later use [116]. However, a general protection fault could overwrite these fields: it stores
0 in SSA.MISC.EXINFO.MADDR and GPEC in SSA.MISC.EXINFO.ERRCD. We have found that
a malformed Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller (APIC) interrupt generates a
general protection fault. The OS can program the APIC to generate such interrupts and thus
general protection faults during enclave execution. Therefore, if a malicious OS generates
a malformed APIC interrupt for an enclave program right after handling a page fault, the
fields in the SSA are overwritten such that an enclave program cannot know whether or not
a page fault has occurred. Further, the OS can generate another normal interrupt (e.g., a
timer interrupt) later to even clear up the GPEC flag. Thus, we conclude that relying on the
exit reason cannot protect an enclave program from the controlled-channel attack.
4.3 System Model
In this section we explain our ideal system model. An ideal enclave (uncontrollable
enclave) protects any enclave program from the security threats explained in §4.2. The basic
requirement of the uncontrollable enclave is to enable an enclave program to know every
interrupt and page table manipulation, and stop its normal execution when it detects that the
OS has unmapped any of its sensitive memory pages.
To achieve these goals, the uncontrollable enclave allows an enclave program to have
two kinds of memory pages: secured pages and controller pages, as shown in Figure 4.1.
First, the secured pages are unobservable pages containing all code and data of an enclave
program. The OS cannot interrupt the enclave program when it executes or accesses the





















Figure 4.1: The uncontrollable enclave model. It consists of secured and controller pages. The
secured page is not interrupted by the OS and its page fault is delivered to the controller page instead
of to the OS. The controller page manages control and data flows between secured pages and handles
page faults generated by accessing secured pages.
these pages. Since secured pages are uninterruptible, the uncontrollable enclave needs to
ensure that execution with secured pages is short (e.g., up to the interval of a timer interrupt)
to prevent a malicious enclave program from fully occupying a CPU core. Also, when the
uncontrollable enclave detects that any of the secured pages are unmapped, it treats the OS
as malicious.
Second, the controller pages relay the control and data flow between the secured pages,
check whether access to the secured pages is hindered by the OS (i.e., unmapped), and
interact with the OS for scheduling and system calls. The OS can interrupt their execution
and monitor page faults generated by accessing them. However, revealing their behavior
does not leak much information because they are just trampoline pages and the actual
execution of an enclave program is performed inside the secured pages.
The uncontrollable enclave ensures that no page fault sequence (i.e., inter-page accesses)
is revealed to an OS. First, when the uncontrollable enclave identifies that a secured page
is unmapped, it stops its execution. This could reveal up to a single page fault to the OS.
Second, the enclave program can let its remote client know whether or not it has successfully
terminated by sending an acknowledgment message. A lack of acknowledgment also means
that there was a problem. Third, the uncontrollable enclave prevents the OS from running the
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enclave program arbitrarily. To achieve this, the enclave program checks whether its client
allows the OS to run itself during a remote attestation process. The remote client would
completely disallow any further execution if the program did not send acknowledgment
messages before. Note that it is natural to assume that an enclave program runs in the cloud
and its remote client controls its execution.
Based on these requirements, we implement a prototype scheme, T-SGX. T-SGX does
not ensure perfect information leakage prevention, but we believe it is sufficient to make the
known controlled-channel attacks impractical (see §4.6 for details).
4.4 Design
In this section, we describe in detail the design of T-SGX, which is a practical realization of
the uncontrollable enclave model (§4.3). In particular, we explain how to realize the model’s
various components using Intel TSX.
4.4.1 Overview of the TSX-based Design
This section describes a working instantiation of our architecture that relies only on a widely
deployed standard processor feature (TSX). This approach yields a practical and effective
side-channel mitigation that can be used today.
Intuitively, the main value of TSX as a side-channel mitigation lies in its ability to
suppress page faults and other synchronous exceptions. A page fault that occurs during a
TSX transaction will not be delivered to the untrusted ring 0 page fault handler. Instead, the
processor will abort the transaction and transfer control to the transaction’s abort code. Thus,
our strategy will be to run enclave code inside transactions and to place a trusted exception
handler in the TSX abort code path.
Figure 4.2 shows a simple example of an enclave program and its TSX-based transfor-
mation. The code between _xbegin and _xend is executed as a transaction. The else branch
contains the abort code path. TSX guarantees that any page fault that occurs while executing
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1 // original code
2 void foo(char *msg, size_t len) {




7 // protected code
8 void ecall_foo(char *msg, size_t len) {
9 if ((status = _xbegin()) == _XBEGIN_STARTED) {
10 foo(msg, len);
11 _xend();
12 } else {




Figure 4.2: A straw man example that wraps the entire enclave code in a TSX transaction to prevent
controlled-channel attacks.
foo(msg,len) is suppressed and control is transferred directly to the abort_handler in the
else branch.
A simple design idea could be to wrap the entire enclave program in a single TSX
transaction. However, for typical programs, such transactions will never complete because
(a) TSX will abort a transaction if its write or read set is too large to fit into the L1 or L3
cache, respectively, and (b) long-running transactions are highly likely to be aborted by
interrupts. Thus, we have to partition the program into small execution blocks and wrap
each execution block in a transaction.
This requires the ability to perform detailed static analysis as well as a number of program
transformations. For this reason, we integrate T-SGX into the compiler. As the source
code is compiled into an enclave binary, T-SGX computes an appropriate partitioning into
execution blocks and makes sure each execution block is protected by TSX by conservatively
placing XBEGIN and XEND instructions (see §4.4.3 for details).
4.4.2 The Springboard
Using many small transactions entails a new problem. As page faults are not suppressed
across transactions, an attacker may still see all page faults he/she is interested in, unless













Figure 4.3: Careless usage of TSX revealing a page fault. An attacker can monitor the page fault at
Page B because a transition between Page A and Page B is not in a transaction.
transition between two transactions is leaked because they are at a page boundary. An
attempt to execute the first instruction on page B causes an observable page fault outside a
transaction.
T-SGX solves this problem by placing all code that executes outside transactions on a
single page. We call this page the springboard. Figure 4.4 displays the code that performs
the transitions between consecutive transactions. An important property of this code is that
it does not access memory on any other page (e.g., stack, heap). Upon receiving an enclave
function call from the host, the entry function begins by jumping to the springboard.begin
block, which starts a transaction with an XBEGIN instruction followed by a jump to the start
of first the block (call in this example). At the end of each block, the T-SGX compiler
inserts two instructions that load the address of the next block into a register and jump to the
springboard.next block. Code on the springboard then ends the current transaction (XEND),
begins the next transaction (XBEGIN), and jumps to the start of the next block, as indicated
by the register value provided by the previous block. Right before the end of execution,
springboard.end ends the last transaction (XEND).
T-SGX also places the transaction abort code on the springboard page. Like the code
that transitions between transactions, the abort code also executes outside a transaction. It
is thus subject to page faults, and we ensure that it does not access memory outside the














13 # (abort handler code)
14 ...
15 # resume execution
16 jmp springboard.begin
1 # entry point to the function wrapper
2 entry_point:
3 leaq EB.start(%rip), %r15
4 jmp springboard.begin
5 EB.start:
6 # (load parameters)
7 call _function
8 # (save return value)






15 # transformed function
16 _function:
17 subq $40, %rsp
18 ...








Figure 4.4: Transaction transition code on the springboard and at the end of each execution block
(denoted EB).
result in a page fault is the springboard. This could happen (a) at the transaction transition
(springboard.next, springboard.begin), and at springboard.end in Figure 4.4 and (b)
in the transaction abort code (springboard.abort).
Example. Figure 4.5 shows how a host program and an OS interact with an enclave
program secured by T-SGX.
1. The host program uses the SGX EENTER instruction to call a function inside the
enclave.
2. EENTER transfers control to the enclave’s springboard. The springboard starts the first
transaction and jumps to the first execution block. As execution blocks complete and
jump back to the springboard, the springboard completes and initiates transactions
and jumps to subsequent execution blocks. While these execution blocks may be
distributed over many memory pages, only the springboard contains code that is not
wrapped in a transaction.
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3. If an exception occurs inside an execution block, the processor transfers control
directly to the abort handler whose address is specified at XBEGIN.
4. The abort handler determines whether it has to restart the transaction or terminate the
enclave program. The operating system will only see exceptions on the springboard
page.
4.4.3 Execution Blocks
This section explains how the T-SGX compiler partitions a program into execution blocks
that can be executed as transactions. We begin with a simple partitioning scheme that yields
correct and functional programs. After that, we introduce various optimization techniques
that drastically reduce the overhead of the simple scheme.
T-SGX computes the control flow graph of the program and tests for each basic block if
it satisfies the transaction limits imposed by TSX and an execution time bound we establish.
In particular, T-SGX makes a conservative estimate of the write and read sets of the basic
blocks with respect to a cache model, as explained in §4.4.4. We approximate execution
time by counting the number of instructions in the basic block. Most basic blocks satisfy the
two constraints. The remaining basic blocks are split by T-SGX into smaller blocks until all
split blocks satisfy the transaction constraints. The resulting set of blocks is the partitioning
into execution blocks under the basic scheme.
4.4.4 Transaction Constraints
TSX imposes strict bounds on the read and write sets of each transaction. The write set must
fit into the L1 data cache. That is, the L1 data cache must be able to hold all memory writes
of a transaction.
For example, on Skylake processors, the L1 data cache has a size of 32 kB. It is 8-way
set associative with 64-byte cache lines. We can visualize this cache as eight copies (ways)











































Figure 4.5: Overall procedure of T-SGX: 1 A host program calls an enclave program. 2 Enclave
execution is managed by the springboard that jumps into execution blocks scattered across multiple
pages. The execution blocks jump back to the springboard when they are successfully executed. 3
When an exception occurs in a execution block, control goes directly to the abort handler on the
springboard. 4 The enclave program either terminates or is interrupted. The OS can only identify
the page containing the springboard.
line size is the granularity at which cache space is assigned. Multiple write operations within
a single 64-byte aligned 64-byte address range occupy a single cache line. This 64-byte line
is mapped to the slot in the L1 cache at the same page offset. A memory access within the
64-byte line causes it to be loaded into one of the eight ways at the corresponding slot in the
L1 cache. This will cause the previous content of the of the way to be evicted from the L1
cache.
As the write set of a transaction must be kept in the L1 cache until the end of the
transaction, a transaction will fail if its write set includes more than eight cache lines that
map to a single slot. The T-SGX compiler uses this cache condition to determine if the
write set of an execution block is too large. If it is, it will split the execution block into


















Main memory L1 cache
Figure 4.6: Mapping of memory addresses to L1 cache slots.
Since the exact addresses of memory write operations may not be known at compile time,
we have to use a conservative approximation. That is, given uncertainty about the addresses
of memory accesses at run time, we assume the worst possibility. This may cause T-SGX
to split the program into unnecessarily small execution blocks. However, it guarantees that
the write set will fit into the L1 cache.
More precisely, we distinguish between three types of memory accesses. First, addresses
that are known completely at compile time can be mapped directly to a cache slot. Second,
memory accesses given by an unknown base address and a known fixed offset (e.g., rsp+8,
rsp+16) are grouped by the base pointer. We compute the maximum number of occupied
ways separately for each group (base pointer) and add the maxima over all groups. Third,
we model an access whose address is completely unknown as occupying one way of every
slot. Finally, we add the largest way-count from each of the three cases to obtain an upper
bound on the L1 requirements of the execution block.
We use a similar strategy to analyze the read set of execution blocks, and we count
instructions as a proxy for execution time.
4.4.5 Optimization Techniques
An empty transaction with XBEGIN and XEND costs about 200 cycles. This can have a
significant performance impact on the end-to-end application run time (see §4.7). The
simple, basic-block-based partitioning uses basic block boundaries as the default place
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1 # TSX Basic
2 EB:
3 ...









13 cmpq $100, 32(%rsp)
14 leaq loop.body(%rip), %r15
15 jbe springboard.next














11 cmpq $100, 32(%rsp)
12 jbe loop.body




Figure 4.7: An example of the loop optimization.
to begin and end transactions. However, it is often possible to place transactions around
larger units of program execution, such as loops or functions. This subsection describes
optimization techniques that follow this strategy and that can remove most of the overhead
of the simple partitioning. Note that these optimizations do not interfere with OS scheduling,
since interrupts cause transactions to be aborted (§2.5).
Loops. Simple partitioning places transactions inside the loop body. That is, every iteration
of even the simplest loops (e.g., memcpy()) is at least one separate transaction. Our first
optimization technique is to pull the transaction out of the loop where possible. Rather than
creating a transaction for every loop iteration, we create a single transaction for the entire
loop execution.
The main difficulty is to determine the write set of a loop. In general, this is not a
tractable problem. However, in practice, many loops have simple relationships between the
iteration number and the addresses of memory accesses in that iteration. For example, we
frequently observe a simple linear relationship. That is, during the k-th iteration, the loop
will access address a+ b ∗ k, where a and b are constants known at compile time. We use
data-flow analysis to determine such relationships.
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Given the write set of the loop, we perform the tests of §4.4.4 to determine if the
optimization can be applied. If the test fails because the number of loop iterations is too
large or unknown, we can still apply the optimization by partially unrolling the loop. For
example, if for up to 100 iterations the write set of the loop fits into the L1 cache, we
place a transaction around every 100 iterations of the loop. This allows us to amortize the
transaction cost over possibly many loop iterations (see Figure 4.7).
Functions and if-statements. This optimization attempts to merge all execution blocks
within a function into a single execution block covering the entire function. We attempt to
compute the write and read sets and instruction count for the entire function. If the function
is complicated (e.g., contains loops), this may not succeed, and we do not optimize the
function. If we can obtain the read and write sets and the instruction count and if they pass
the tests of §4.4.4 then we merge the entire function into a single execution block.
Similarly, if we can determine the read and write sets of if-then-else statements and
if they meet the conditions of §4.4.4, we merge the if-then-else statement into a single
execution block.
4.4.6 Abort Sequence
If a transaction fails, TSX will transfer control to the abort address specified in the XBEGIN
instruction. T-SGX places this address on the springboard.
A simple version of the abort code restarts the transaction unconditionally until it
succeeds. The appeal of this design lies in its simplicity. The abort code is stateless and
only a few instructions long. However, if a transaction has to access a page that has been
unmapped, this design will restart the transaction indefinitely, which is not an optimal
defense strategy (§4.6).
The alternative is for the abort code to monitor transaction aborts for signs of attacks
and to stop program execution if an attack is detected. Lacking hardware support for
distinguishing between page faults and regular interrupts as the cause of a transaction abort,
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we use the following criterion. If a transaction aborts more than n times, the abort code
will terminate program execution, where n is a parameter that must be chosen such that the
likelihood of seeing n consecutive transaction aborts due to benign causes under normal
operation is very low. Based on the analysis of §4.7.2, we set n = 10. The controlled-
channel attack [3] requires millions of page faults to obtain sensitive information, so that 10
would be a reasonable threshold to defeat it.
Aborting execution when an unmapped page is detected may leak to the attacker that the
enclave was trying to access this page. However, as explained in §4.6, this strategy ensures
that the attacker does not learn anything else through the page fault channel.
An implementation difficulty arises from the fact that the attack detection code is not
stateless, as it has to count the number of times a transaction is aborted. In order to maintain
the important springboard property that the only memory accesses of springboard code
outside transactions are execute accesses to the springboard page, we store the counter in a
CPU register that we reserve in the compiler.
4.4.7 Preventing Reruns
The decision to run the enclave should be made by its owner and not by the attacker. This
can be easily enforced by having the enclave code wait for a cryptographically secured
authorization before it accesses sensitive data. We make this authorization an optional part
of T-SGX.
The attack model of [3] assumes that the victim runs only once. Furthermore, the use
model described in [3] (a remote user controlling a SGX-protected Haven instance or VM
in the cloud via a remote desktop protocol) effectively includes an authorization to run (the




T-SGX places an XEND before calls from the enclave into the untrusted part of the address
space (an EEXIT instruction). Similarly, T-SGX places a XBEGIN instruction close to the
enclave entry points specified in the SGX Thread Control Structures (TCSs).
4.4.9 Illegal instructions
The T-SGX compiler ensures that no instructions that are illegal under SGX or TSX are
generated for an enclave binary. This is unproblematic, as those instructions are not necessary
to generate regular application code.
4.5 Implementation
We have built a prototype of T-SGX based on the LLVM compiler. Our prototype produces
T-SGX-enabled binaries that can be run in an enclave just like the original binary. Our
prototype can handle arbitrary C and C++ code.
The main part of our prototype is integrated into the back-end of LLVM. It starts by
performing the analysis described in §4.4 based on the basic blocks produced by LLVM.
After that, it modifies the instruction sequence as it is being emitted by LLVM. In particular,
it places two instructions (to load the address of the next execution block into the r15 register
and to jump to the springboard) at the end of each execution block. In the case of 64-bit
code, we reserve the r15 register for this purpose (i.e., to communicate the address of the
next block to the springboard). Jump and call instructions (including indirect jumps and
calls) are also made to jump to the springboard with the destination address loaded into r15.
As TSX uses the rax register, we reserve a second register to save the value of rax at
the end of each execution block that writes to rax and to restore it at the beginning of each
execution block that reads rax before writing to it.
Our prototype also includes a plugin to the LLVM front-end that injects a function
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wrapper for each exported function into the LLVM intermediate representation. The entire
prototype consists of 4,110 lines of C++ code.
4.6 Security Analysis
For T-SGX-based enclave programs, the attacker can only observe page fault locations
(faulting addresses) on (a) the springboard page and (b) the unsecured pages containing
function wrappers for the external enclave entry points. The latter can be ignored, as they
do not access sensitive data.
Furthermore, as shown below, the attacker cannot use page faults to obtain deterministic
notification when enclave execution accesses the springboard. These two properties of
T-SGX disable the two main uses of the page-fault channel in the attacks of [3] and [33]:
(a) leaking page numbers of memory accesses and (b) giving the attacker synchronization
points that allow him/her to track the the victim’s execution. An example of the latter is the
strategic unmapping of code pages in [3] such that, every time the victim calls a function that
accesses sensitive data (looking up a word in the Hunspell hash table, rendering a character,
decoding an 8× 8 pixel block of an image), a page fault interrupts (stops) the victim and
invokes the attacker, who can then advance him/her state machine and update the set of
unmapped pages. By blocking these two mechanisms, T-SGX effectively protects enclave
programs against the known page-fault-channel-based attacks.
For the full-strength T-SGX variant that requires the enclave-owner’s consent to run
the enclave program (§4.4.7) and that aborts enclave execution as soon as a page fault is
detected (§4.4.6), a stronger statement can be made: The attacker will learn at most one
page access by the victim. Recall that the attacks of [3] required millions of page faults.
Given a reliable attack detection mechanism, the argument is straightforward. The
first time one of the victim’s transactions aborts, T-SGX will detect an attack and stop the
execution. As the attacker will not be able to run the victim again, he/she cannot observe
more than the one page access that caused the springboard to abort the execution. Whether
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the attack detection described in §4.4.6 is sufficiently robust is arguable.
Attack detection. For enclave execution, it is reasonable to require that the enclave
encounters no unexpected page faults. Thus, attack detection reduces to detecting page
faults for T-SGX-secured pages. The problem would be trivial if the TSX hardware would
distinguish between page faults and interrupts in the eax value provided to the abort handler.
Lacking such hardware support, our abort handler declares an attack after a small number of
consecutive transaction failures. This approximation is motivated by our evaluation (§4.7):
Transactions tend to be short (1,000 to 2,000 cycles), and we have never observed more than
three consecutive transaction aborts or false positives.
Restarting the transaction several times before aborting enclave execution could, in
principle, give the attacker an opportunity to observe that the page has been accessed and to
make the page accessible before the springboard terminates enclave execution. However,
it appears that the attacker would have to rely mainly on other mechanisms (beyond the
page-fault channel) to detect that the page had been accessed. In other words, while we
cannot exclude the possibility that the attacker could gain more information, it appears that
he/she would have to rely primarily on powerful mechanisms beyond the page-fault channel
(e.g., cache side channels), which is not the focus of T-SGX.
Attacks on the Springboard. We noted above that the attacker cannot obtain deterministic
notification of springboard accesses through the page-fault channel. More precisely, the
attacker cannot force page faults on springboard accesses.
Before execution of sensitive enclave code starts, the springboard must be mapped and
accessed since any sensitive code is called from the springboard. The attacker can, of course,
unmap the springboard in the page tables at any time. However, accesses to springboard
will continue to succeed (without causing page faults) as long as the springboard’s mapping
is in the TLB. Furthermore, this mapping is unlikely to be evicted quickly from the TLB, as
the springboard is accessed very frequently (§4.7).
All reliable methods for removing the springboard’s mapping from the TLB (e.g.,
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flushing the TLB) require the attacker to run code on the enclave’s core or send an inter-
processor interrupt (IPI) to the core, interrupting the enclave execution eventually. The key
observation is that, by construction of T-SGX, the instruction pointer value at which enclave
execution will resume is on the springboard. Thus, if the attacker wants enclave execution to
proceed, he will have to map the springboard in the page tables before resuming the enclave
(ERESUME). The instruction at which enclave execution resumes will be on the springboard,
and its execution will establish a new TLB entry for the springboard, which sets the attack
back to the beginning.
In summary, while the attacker can interrupt enclave execution asynchronously, he
cannot use the page-fault channel to obtain deterministic notification of accesses to the
springboard.
4.7 Evaluation
We evaluate T-SGX by answering the following questions.
• How general is the T-SGX approach? Can this approach be applied to a wide range
of legacy real world applications without manual effort?
• What are the performance characteristics of T-SGX-based programs?
• What is the performance impact of running multiple instances of T-SGX-based
applications simultaneously?
Experimental setup. The experiments were conducted on a generic PC with a Supermicro
X11SSQ motherboard, an Intel Core i7-6700K 4 GHz (Skylake) CPU, and 64 GB of
RAM. The machine ran Windows 10 Pro. We disabled hyperthreading because avoiding
cache-timing attacks in the public cloud is recommended.
Target applications. We evaluate T-SGX by using the programs in the nbench benchmark
suite and the three applications that were used by Xu et al. [3] to demonstrate the controlled-
channel attack. Table 4.1 describes each program in detail, including source code size,
description, and binary code size before and after applying T-SGX. The applications are
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Table 4.1: Benchmark programs (top) and applications (bottom) used to evaluate T-SGX.
Application LoC Description #exec. Code segment size Avrage increaseblocks Baseline T-SGX Memory Overhead bytes per block
numeric sort 211 Numeric heap sort 23 1,014 B 1,276 B 25.8% 11.4 B
string sort 521 String heap sort 46 2,745 B 3,358 B 22.3% 13.3 B
bitfield 225 Bit operations 24 1,182 B 1,472 B 24.5% 12.1 B
fp emulation 1,396 Floating-point emulation 80 5,636 B 6,467 B 14.7% 10.4 B
fourier 235 Signal processing 20 1,163 B 1,386 B 19.2% 11.2 B
assignment 490 Assignment algorithm 92 3,605 B 4,758 B 32.0% 12.5 B
idea 353 Crypto 36 3,101 B 3,553 B 14.6% 12.6 B
huffman 448 Compression 44 2,960 B 3,648 B 19.2% 15.6 B
neural net 746 Back-propagation network simulation 82 4,183 B 4,941 B 18.1% 9.2 B
lu decomposition 441 Linear equations solving algorithm 62 3,307 B 4,136 B 25.1% 13.4 B
AVERAGE 22.0%
libjpeg (9a) 34,763 JPEG library 4,557 272,881 B 350,274 B 28.4% 17.0 B
Hunspell (1.5.0) 24,794 Spell checking library 8,641 356,298 B 471,617 B 35.0% 13.3 B
FreeType (2.5.3) 135,528 Font rendering library 12,060 615,862 B 796,105 B 29.3% 14.9 B
AVERAGE 28.6%
fairly diverse, including cryptography, text processing, and image compression. While the
nbench applications are generally small, the other three applications are one to two orders
of magnitude larger, with FreeType exceeding 100,000 lines of code.
4.7.1 Application Binaries
This section shows various properties of T-SGX binaries. The main effort in obtaining these
binaries lies in porting the applications into the SGX environment. Once we had working
SGX applications, no further manual effort was required to apply the T-SGX protections.
After manually adapting the source code of each application to run on SGX (resolving
header and linker dependencies), we compiled the code with Clang-Cl, a cl.exe-compatible
driver mode program for Clang (based on LLVM version 3.7.1). We linked the resulting
object files into executables with the Microsoft linker (link.exe) version 14.00.23506.0.
We built three versions of each application. (a) The baseline version runs in an SGX
enclave without any protection. (b) The TSX-basic version is secured with TSX on SGX,
yet without any optimization. (c) The T-SGX version is secured with TSX and optimized as
described in §4.4.5. These optimization techniques improve performance without affecting
security.
Execution Block Counts and Code Size. We first measure basic statistics of each
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application, in particular, static information such as the number of execution blocks and the
impact on code size. Table 4.1 shows the results. The reported code sizes are the sizes (in
bytes) of the code (.text) segments of all object files associated with the application. In the
case of nbench where several applications share the same source file (and the same object
file), we built per-application versions of nbench by commenting out all source code that
did not belong in the application.
The code size increase (excluding the springboard page) from baseline to T-SGX varies
between 15% and 32%. These overheads will likely result in somewhat increased pressure
on the L1 instruction cache. However, there will be no effect on the application’s data
accesses. Thus, the increase in the overall memory requirements will be significantly lower
than 30%, depending on the application and its inputs.
The table also reports the number of execution blocks in T-SGX. Dividing the size
increase by the number of execution blocks reveals an average size increase of 9 to 17 bytes
per execution block. This is roughly the space needed to store the two additional instructions
that jump to the springboard and the occasional instructions to save and restore rax (§4.5).
Distribution of Execution Block Sizes. The next measurement studies the size of execu-
tion blocks. Figure 4.8 displays the distribution of the number of instructions per execution
block for T-SGX and TSX-basic across the 10 nbench applications.
We observe that the optimizations of §4.4.5 have noticeably shifted the distribution for
T-SGX toward larger blocks. The small blocks (containing at most 10 instructions) are
mostly the result of (a) non-mergeable cases, such as a block immediately before or after a
loop, (b) nested loops, and (c) calls to functions that may not satisfy the cache constraint.
We manually inspected two large outlier blocks (up to 120 instructions). Both correspond
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Figure 4.8: Distribution of execution block sizes: The optimizations increase the size of a typical
execution block.
4.7.2 Run-time Performance
This section demonstrates the run-time performance of T-SGX. Unless stated otherwise,
measurement values are averaged over five runs of nbench and the real applications. For the
nbench suite, we ran each program for five second and measured the number of iterations
per second.
For jpeglib, we measured how long it takes to decompress a 1220×813 (203,446 bytes)
compressed jpeg image. The size of the decoded image is 8,926,740 bytes. The measurement
includes the image decompression time but not general startup and initialization.
For Hunspell, we picked the book Around the World Eighty Days as the input. The
number of words extracted from the book is 63,704. We performed a spell check (using
Hunspell::spell) on these words with the "en_US" dictionary as a single call into the
enclave and measured the total time spent.
We used the same input for FreeType. The number of characters in the book is 375,338.
We measured the time required for a single enclave call that renders all these characters
(using FT_Load_Char).
Run-time Overhead. Table 4.2 displays the run-time of the baseline, TSX-basic, and
T-SGX versions of the applications and the associated overheads. We took the numbers for
the nbench applications directly from the nbench outputs.
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Table 4.2: Run-time overhead of TSX-basic and T-SGX over baseline.
Application Baseline TSX-basic (overhead) T-SGX (overhead)
numeric sort 12,682 iter/s 1,149.1 iter/s (9.1×) 8,390.1 iter/s (1.5×)
string sort 8,872.3 iter/s 1,991.1 iter/s (4.1×) 7,218.7 iter/s (1.2×)
bitfield 516,000,000 iter/s 26,100,000 iter/s (17.9×) 443,000,000 iter/s (2.1×)
fp emulation 319.8 iter/s 25.3 iter/s (11.9×) 146.4 iter/s (2.2×)
fourier 186,000 iter/s 31,847 iter/s (5.4×) 98,847 iter/s (1.9×)
assignment 1,741.9 iter/s 82.6 iter/s (18.4×) 1,196 iter/s (1.5×)
idea 3,814.1 iter/s 275.3 iter/s (13.0×) 3,665.7 iter/s (1.0×)
huffman 3,264.7 iter/s 162.6 iter/s (16.6×) 1,641.5 iter/s (2.0×)
neural net 45.7 iter/s 3.8 iter/s (11.1×) 27.3 iter/s (1.7×)
lu decomposition 1,197.6 iter/s 82.4 iter/s (13.6×) 883.4 iter/s (1.4×)
GEOMEAN 11.0× 1.5×
libjpeg 6,784.5 kB/s 846.4 kB/s (8.0×) 4,674.1 kB/s (1.5×)
Hunspell 176,000 word/s 36,333.3 word/s (4.9×) 114,000 word/s (1.6×)
FreeType 37,747.2 char/s 3,047.7 char/s (12.4×) 28,394.5 char/s (1.3×)
GEOMEAN 7.8× 1.4×
The overhead of T-SGX ranges from 4% to 118% with a geometric mean of 50%.
While this overhead is significant, it does not appear prohibitive. The table also demonstrates
the effectiveness of the optimizations of §4.4.5. Without these optimization techniques, the
overhead would have been significantly higher (as high as 17.9×). It seems that additional
optimization could reduce the overhead even further.
Transaction Properties. Table 4.3 displays the rate at which T-SGX transactions are
aborted and the reason, as indicated by the value of the eax register at the time of the
abort. We observe up to about 500 aborted transactions per second with an eax value of 0,
indicating an interrupt or exception. This rate follows closely the per-core interrupt arrival
rate, which we observed using Windows performance counters.
We observed no transaction abort with eax bit 3 set (CAP). This bit is set if an “internal
buffer overflowed,” which includes the case when a transaction’s read or write set does not
fit into the corresponding caches. This confirms the conservative nature of our cache model.
We also observed small numbers of aborted transactions with eax bits 1 and 2 set (CON).
These bits indicate "transaction may succeed on retry" and "another logical processor
conflicts with read or write set," respectively.
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Table 4.3: Rate and type of transaction aborts for the nbench applications for T-SGX.
TX CON CAP Abort Rate
numeric sort 481 times/s 20 times/s 0 times/s 0.0020%
string sort 317.3 times/s 5.3 times/s 0 times/s 0.0020%
bitfield 532 times/s 2.3 times/s 0 times/s 0.0120%
fp emulation 314 times/s 8.5 times/s 0 times/s 0.0006%
fourier 221.5 times/s 1.5 times/s 0 times/s 0.0006%
assignment 572.5 times/s 13.5 times/s 0 times/s 0.0020%
idea 707 times/s 9.5 times/s 0 times/s 0.0160%
huffman 530.7 times/s 8 times/s 0 times/s 0.0013%
neural net 485.5 times/s 35.2 times/s 0 times/s 0.0015%
lu decomposition 480 times/s 27.3 times/s 0 times/s 0.0016%
Transaction Duration. Figure 4.9 displays the distribution of transaction duration. We
measured the duration of each transaction by instrumenting the springboard code that begins
and ends transactions with rdtsc instructions. As the rdtsc instruction is illegal under SGX
and entering and leaving enclaves add significant noise to the measurement, we performed
this experiment by running the applications outside SGX enclaves.
Figure 4.9 shows the distribution of transaction duration for T-SGX and TSX-basic. For
TSX-basic, most transactions take less than 1,000 cycles. As a result of the optimizations, a
typical transaction for T-SGX takes between 1,000 and 2,000 cycles. Still, the transaction
duration is short enough to easily meet the execution time constraint imposed by the
interrupt frequency. For example, our 4 GHz processor should be able to complete 2,000-
cycle-transactions even for interrupt rates of up to 2 million interrupts per second per core.
Such a rate is orders of magnitude higher than the interrupt rates we have observed under
normal conditions (thousands of interrupts per second per core). This observation is also
consistent with Table 4.3.
Transaction Abort Counts. We study the number of times a transaction aborts before
it succeeds. We gather these counts by instrumenting the TSX management code on the
springboard.
Table 4.4 displays the distribution of abort counts across the 10 nbench applications.
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Figure 4.9: Distribution of transaction times: Most transactions take less than 3,000 cycles.
transactions requires up to three retries. After executing many millions of transactions, we
observed no transaction requiring more than three retries to complete. This observation can
be used as the basis for a mechanism to detect attacks or anomalies.
Table 4.4: Distribution of the number of times a transaction aborts before it succeeds.
Number of aborts Percentage
0 99.9%
1 1.7 · 10-3%
2 9.8 · 10-6%
3 3.7 · 10-7%
4 0 %
Multiple instances. The next experiment analyzes the performance of multiple T-SGX-
protected enclaves running side by side. Our goal is to analyze whether T-SGX scales to
multiple protected enclaves.
We measured the running time of baseline and T-SGX for the nbench applications,
varying the number of concurrent instances from one to eight. For each measurement, we
created n identical enclaves in n separate Windows processes (n ∈ {1, . . . , 8}) running one
of the 10 nbench applications for baseline or T-SGX and recorded the timing output of
nbench for one of the enclaves. We repeated the measurement for n from 1 to 8, for all 10
nbench applications and for both configurations (baseline and T-SGX).
































Figure 4.10: Overhead with increasing number of parallel instances. It shows that T-SGX can be
scaled for system-wide uses in practice.
Each line corresponds to one nbench application. The y-value is the ratio of the number
of iterations per second for T-SGX and for baseline. In other words, it is the inverse of
the overhead. All lines are roughly constant, indicating that one can run multiple T-SGX-
protected enclaves without affecting the overhead.
4.8 Discussion
In this section we explain limitations of T-SGX and possible approaches to overcome them.
Also, we explain other potential attacks against T-SGX and show how we can cope with
them.
4.8.1 Limitations
One limitation of T-SGX is that it cannot correctly identify what causes an exception. A
transactional execution aborts when an exception has been generated, but it does not let a
program know the vector number of the exception (§2.5). T-SGX can distinguish a syn-
chronous exception from an asynchronous exception by repeatedly executing a transactional
region, but it cannot know whether the synchronous exception is a page fault, a divide-by-
zero error, or something else. This could be a problem because T-SGX may mistake errors
in the enclave software for an attack by the OS. To avoid this problem, we plan to develop
an application exception handler (§2.2) running inside an enclave that dynamically inspects
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the code and execution status to know the exception reason and to fix it to ensure continuous
execution.
Second, T-SGX cannot protect libraries without source code because it is a compiler-
based approach. This problem could be solved when library developers apply T-SGX to their
closed-source libraries. Also, we plan to improve T-SGX to support binary instrumentation.
Third, T-SGX does not support page-level swapping between enclave memory and
main memory, as Sanctum [136] does. This limitation would be problematic, especially
when T-SGX runs in the public cloud while sharing the limited enclave memory with other
processes. One possible solution to this problem is to swap out the whole memory of an
enclave program to the main memory. We plan to study the effectiveness of this approach in
the future.
Finally, T-SGX cannot support a multithreaded enclave program that wants use TSX for
its original purpose: lock elision. However, this does not hurt the program’s functionality
because lock elision is just an optional feature. Instead, it can use a traditional lock for
synchronization between different threads without any problem.
4.8.2 Other Side-channel Attacks
We explain other side channel attacks that could attack T-SGX and discuss possible coun-
termeasures against them.
Cache timing attack. A cache timing attack by a malicious OS is a serious threat because
the OS manages the virtual address mapping of every program [130]. To mitigate the threat,
an enclave program needs to flush its private cache whenever the OS resumes its execution,
but, generally, it cannot obtain such information. Fortunately, with T-SGX, an enclave
program can know exactly when it is resumed by the OS such that it only needs to flush its
private cache at that point. However, this mitigation is not enough to cope with asynchronous
cache timing attacks that use the last-level cache (LLC) [137, 138]. We plan to study how to
secure enclave programs from such attacks.
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Memory bus snooping attack. A memory bus snooping attack is a hardware-level
attack. By monitoring memory bus traffic, a malicious peripheral device can know which
memory addresses are currently accessed by a CPU although the memory contents are
encrypted by SGX. To prevent such an attack, SGX needs to provide software-level or
hardware-level ORAM techniques [135, 139, 124, 13]. Also, we can minimize the number
of memory accesses as much as possible by using cache-based [140, 141, 142, 133] or
register-based [143, 144] computations.
4.9 Related Work
In this section, we discuss a number of important studies that are related to T-SGX.
Trusted execution environments. Mainstream computing environments are typically very
complex. They provide only limited assurance for confidentiality and integrity in light of
various attacks such as malware, kernel exploits, and malicious peripherals. Numerous
researchers and companies have proposed a variety of TEEs to protect critical data and
computations with higher assurance. TEEs typically do not trust the main OS because it
could be compromised. Thus, they are implemented in places that even the OS cannot control,
such as a trusted hypervisor or hardware. For example, Overshadow [145], NOVA [146],
TrustVisor [147], Cloud Terminal [148], InkTag [134], MiniBox [149], and Sego [150] are
TEEs based on trusted hypervisors. The basic idea of these systems is to provide isolated
memory for each trusted process or module by using nested page tables or the extended
page table feature of hardware-based virtualization. Also, all the interactions between a
trusted process and the OS (i.e., system calls) have to be managed by the trusted hypervisor.
However, a hypervisor is also software and potentially vulnerable to various attacks [151].
Flicker [152] and TrustVisor [147] use trusted hardware (TPM [114]) and attempt to min-
imize the complexity of their TEE software. ARM’s TrustZone [61], Intel’s TXT [115]
and SGX [116], and Samsung’s KNOX [113] are widely-deployed hardware-based TEEs.
Numerous researchers have proposed hardware-based TEE designs, such as TrInc [153],
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SICE [154], SecureSwitch [155], OASIS [156], TrustLite [157], and Sanctum [136].
OS attacks against TEEs. Although TEEs are designed to protect user processes from a
malicious OS, the latter still has opportunities to attack the processes because they cannot ac-
cess system resources (e.g., storage, network) without the help of the OS. Iago attacks [158]
exploit this limitation. For example, an Iago attack may manipulate the return value (i.e., a
virtual address) of the mmap() system call to make a target application overwrite a portion
of its stack and, thereby, hijack control flow. Since any system call could potentially be
exploited for this type of attack, the TEE has to carefully validate the return values of all
system calls [134, 159]. The controlled-channel attacks [3, 33] this thesis work focuses
on also rely on the fact that the OS manages system memory. Finally, AsyncShock [160]
demonstrates that synchronization bugs that are mostly harmless in a traditional environment
can allow an adversarial OS to compromise SGX enclaves.
SGX applications. Among the various hardware-based TEEs, Intel SGX recently has been
receiving much attention because it is widely deployed (all Intel Skylake CPUs support it)
and because it allows developers to use almost the full unprivileged instruction set of the Intel
CPU. For example, Haven [127], Graphene-SGX [128, 129], and SCONE [161] are SGX-
based platforms to securely run an unmodified application in an untrusted cloud. VC3 [123],
M2R [124], and Ohrimenko et al. [94] use SGX to perform data analytics, MapReduce com-
putations, and machine learning computations while ensuring confidentiality and integrity.
Also, Kim et al. [125], S-NFV [126], Pires et al. [162], and SecureKeeper [163] show
how we can use SGX for securing network services, content-based routing, and distributed
computing.
Moat [164] and CONFIDENTIAL [165] design verification methodologies for enclave
programs to check whether they are secure. Also, OpenSGX [159] is an emulator for the
execution of enclave programs for software development and in-depth debugging and testing.
Further, SGX-Shield [14] implements fine-grained address space layout randomization
(ASLR) for SGX. Ryoan [166] introduces a distributed two-way sandbox to run untrusted
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enclave programs with sensitive user data while preventing possible information leakage.
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CHAPTER 5
SECURING SGX PROGRAMS AGAINST SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS VIA
LOAD-TIME SYNTHESIS
5.1 Introduction
Ensuring confidential computing is necessary as many applications tend to be executed in
remote and shared environments, e.g., the public cloud. In such environments, users or
tenants just specify the performance and characteristics of the hardware they want to lease
and the duration, reducing costs and maintenance efforts [167]. However, since the hardware
is not only owned and managed by service providers but also shared with other tenants, their
sensitive computation and data potentially suffer from information leakage [168].
Hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX [62, 122],
AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) [169], and ARM TrustZone (TZ) [61], are
considered as a promising approach to realize confidential computing. Especially, Intel SGX
ensures even underlying system software and hardware cannot compromise the authentic-
ity, confidentiality, and integrity of userspace SGX applications running inside enclaves.
Leading cloud service providers, such as Microsoft and Google, are developing Software
Development Kits (SDKs) and frameworks for confidential computing [170, 171, 172] to
support their customers.
Unfortunately, Intel SGX is not a silver bullet for all security problems especially because
it does not cover side-channel attacks (SCAs) [173], which are serious threats to shared
computing environments that it aims to be deployed. Numerous researchers have shown that
SGX is vulnerable to various SCAs including cache-based SCAs [6, 8, 34, 35, 5], page-table-
based SCAs [3, 4, 31, 32, 33], and speculative execution SCAs [38, 39], which can infer
sensitive control flows or exfiltrate secret data. To avoid such security threats, researchers
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Table 5.1: Side-channel attacks against SGX and countermeasures. Hyper-Threading Technology
(HT), L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF), and Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS).
Attack Countermeasure
Cache Cache flushing [18] and cache eviction detection [20]
Page Page fault detection [17] and huge page [174]
HT HT disabling [18] and co-location detection [22, 21]
Interrupt Frequent AEX monitoring [22, 175]
Branch prediction Branch obfuscation [9]
Speculation Branch prediction control [176], lfence [177]
L1TF Cache flushing and HT disabling [18]
MDS HT disabling [19]
have also proposed software- and/or hardware-based countermeasures or mitigation against
individual SCAs, such as cache flushing [18, 19] or eviction detection [20], page fault
detection [17], and HT disabling [18, 19] or co-location detection [21, 22] (Table 5.1).
To ensure the security of an SGX program, developers must ensure that it is immune to
at least all known, defeated SCAs. One naïve approach to achieve this goal is incorporating
all existing countermeasures, but, this does not work in practice because of 1) deployability,
2) overprotection, and/or 3) incompatibility problems.
First, some countermeasures, especially, hardware-assisted ones, highly depend on
underlying hardware and system configurations, so deploying them to public cloud environ-
ments abstracting configuration details [178] is challenging. For example, Cloak [20] and
T-SGX [17] leverage a CPU instruction, TSX [179], to detect cache- and page-table-based
SCAs, respectively. However, since only high-end Intel CPUs support TSX (e.g., Xeon
and Core i7), they cannot be deployed to a platform with a low-end CPU, such as Pentium
Silver. Further, even if a CPU itself supports a required instruction, administrators or system
software has a chance to deactivate it via microcode update or control registers. Thus,
developers might have to write a bloated program considering all feasible combinations of
configurations, or compile a program for different configurations whenever they want to
execute it in the public cloud, which is time and resource-consuming especially when they
want to deploy the program to multiple machines for distributed computing [180, 123].
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Second, the overhead of individual countermeasures can be accumulated if developers
do not try to eliminate redundant protections during combining them. For example, HT is
the fundamental source of cache-based and speculative execution SCAs, and co-location
detection [22, 21] can be used to disrupt this channel. However, enabling this technique is
a waste of resources if a target platform does not support HT or is patched with a recent
microcode update to disable HT within SGX [18, 19]. Unless developers accurately identify
the detailed configurations of a target platform in advance, which is difficult to be assumed
in the (potentially malicious) public cloud, they cannot identify and cancel out redundant
protections.
Third, existing countermeasures are independently developed to prevent each SCA
such that they do not consider any potential incompatibilities between each of them. For
example, shared-memory-based thread co-location detection [21, 22] cannot directly work
with TSX-based mitigation [17, 20] because such conflicting shared-memory accesses can
abort TSX without cache-line eviction or page fault. Therefore, developers have to identify
conflicting techniques and customize them to protect an SGX program from more than one
SCAs (e.g., detecting co-location outside TSX transactions).
In this thesis, we propose PRIDWEN, a framework to dynamically synthesize SCA-free
SGX programs according to the hardware and system configurations of a target platform.
PRIDWEN has a universal loader that securely transforms and loads a given SGX program
inside an enclave by using the four components: 1) configuration prober, 2) pass manager,
3) program synthesizer, and 4) validator. First, the configuration prober reliably identi-
fies the target platform’s hardware and system configurations based on SGX exception
handling logic and remote attestation procedure (§5.3.3), which are robust against system
software’s malicious manipulation. Second, based on the identified configurations, the pass
manager determines a subset of instrumentation passes that are necessary to protect an SGX
program from all feasible SCAs at the target platform while having low incompatibility
and performance problems (§5.3.4). Third, the program synthesizer hardens a given SGX
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program with the chosen instrumentation passes. To realize lightweight program synthesis
that demands a small amount of memory such that can fit into an enclave, PRIDWEN uses
Wasm [60, 181] as its IR. That is, PRIDWEN assumes that SGX programs provided to it
are compiled into Wasm. PRIDWEN develops comprehensive instrumentation interfaces
to transform such Wasm-based SGX programs both at Wasm IR and native code levels,
and eventually produces a final executable (§5.3.5). Lastly, the validator confirms whether
the final executable has been correctly produced to avoid any potential incompatibility and
security problems (§5.3.6).
As a case study, we write four passes for PRIDWEN to show its flexibility: T-SGX [17] to
prevent a page-fault SCA with a hardware support, Varys [22] to mitigate a page-fault attack
in a software-only manner, QSpectre [177] to mitigate the Spectre attack, and fine-grained
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [14] as a general-purpose mitigation, and
show how PRIDWEN can selectively incorporate them according to hardware configurations.
Our evaluation shows the acceptable performance overhead and faithfulness of PRIDWEN.
PRIDWEN synthesized programs within 0.5 s while temporarily spending up to 25 MiB of
enclave memory only during a synthesization. Compared to software-only, redundant miti-
gation, PRIDWEN with hardware-assisted, non-redundant mitigation improved the runtime
performance by up to 2×. The runtime overhead of synthesized and instrumented programs
was around 1–6× depending on applications and configurations, which is acceptable as a
recent study shows that Wasm could have up to 3× slowdown [182] without adopting any
defenses. Also, we confirmed that PRIDWEN faithfully compiled and ran all 73 programs
from the official Wasm specification test suite [183] without notable problems.
We will make the design and implementation of PRIDWEN publicly available as an
open-source project, allowing communities to use, test, and contribute. The openness of
PRIDWEN should help not only improving its security, but also constructing a foundation
for the SCA-resistant SGX ecosystem.
In summary, this thesis work makes the following contributions:
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• Hardware-aware load-time software hardening. To the best of our knowledge,
PRIDWEN is the first framework that can dynamically synthesize hardened software
within an enclave by choosing optimal (robust and efficient) hardware-assisted or
software-only security mechanisms according to underlying hardware supports.
• Comprehensive Wasm instrumentation. PRIDWEN’s Wasm instrumentation is com-
prehensive: it can instrument Wasm both at IR and native code, unlike related studies
that only consider IRs [184, 185]. Native code instrumentation are especially neces-
sary to adopt countermeasure for SCAs dealing with machine code.
• Reliable hardware probing. PRIDWEN’s exception- and remote-attestation-based
hardware probing is robust against malicious system software. What attackers can do
is just denying its execution.
• Instrumentation validation. PRIDWEN supports validation passes to confirm whether
final binaries are generated as expected, enabling secure, functional, and efficient
adoption of various countermeasures.
5.2 Threat Model
Our threat model is similar to the threat models of other SGX-related studies, such as [3,
17, 22]. Our Trusted Computing Base (TCB) consists of an SGX enclave provided by an
Intel CPU and code running in the enclave including the PRIDWEN loader (i.e., prober, pass
manager, synthesizer, and validator) and a target Wasm binary prepared by a developer. We
assume that the developer uses remote attestation to confirm the validity of the CPU and
the PRIDWEN loader, and establishes a secure channel with the loader to securely transmit
his/her binaries. Any threats due to the potential vulnerabilities of the CPU and the code
running in an enclave are out of our consideration.
We assume that adversaries have already compromised the underlying systems software
to attack the PRIDWEN loader and the target binary it will run. What the adversaries can
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leverage to attack them via side channels include 1) the page table of an enclave program to
intentionally trigger page faults and monitor access and dirty flags; 2) the cache status of an
enclave program to monitor it before, after, and during the execution of an enclave; 3) the
assignment of an enclave program to logical cores (i.e., processor affinity) to concurrently
monitor its behaviors through a co-located attack thread; 4) the (frequent) interrupts to an
enclave program to increase the accuracy of side-channel attacks; and 5) other speculative
side channels (i.e., indirect branch predictor, L1TF, and MDS). Also, we assume that the
adversaries try to prevent the PRIDWEN hardware prober from identifying correct hardware
information to make it use weaker or software-only mitigation.
5.3 PRIDWEN Design
This section outlines the design of PRIDWEN, including goals, an overview, and the detail
of each key component.
5.3.1 Goals
1 Adaptivity. A goal of PRIDWEN is to be adaptive to the hardware configuration of the
underlying system. Such adaptivity allows PRIDWEN to take advantage of the hardware
capabilities fully and therefore to provide a similar level of protection against SCAs in
distinct environments while minimizing the runtime overheads.
2 Extensibility. Another goal of PRIDWEN is being extensible enough to support not only
existing but new mitigation techniques against SCAs. Also, the PRIDWEN aims to support
combinations of multiple mitigation techniques. The extensibility of PRIDWEN should also
allow for the smooth integration of unsupported mitigation techniques.
3 Transparency. The last goal of PRIDWEN is to transparently apply various mitigation
techniques while doing not affect the functionality of a target program. Except for potential
slowdown and additional memory usage, PRIDWEN should maintain the primary behavior
of the program.
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Figure 5.1: Overview of PRIDWEN. 1 A developer compiles his/her program into a Wasm binary
and transmits it to the loader via a secure channel. 2 PRIDWEN probes the current CPU config-
urations. In this example, it founds that the CPU enables TSX and IBRS while disabling HT. 3
PRIDWEN selects and prioritizes mitigation passes. Here, it chooses T-SGX and then ASLR because
the CPU enables TSX (leveraged to detect page-fault attacks) and IBRS (mitigating some Spectre
variants), and disables HT (no HT-required attacks). 4 PRIDWEN synthesizes a native binary based
on the Wasm binary while hardening it with the chosen passes. 5 PRIDWEN validates whether the
final native binary is correct according to given validation passes, and then executes it.
5.3.2 Overview
Figure 5.1 shows an overview of PRIDWEN. The core of PRIDWEN is an in-enclave loader
that implements four key ideas with corresponding components: user-mode hardware
probing with the prober, optimal pass selection with the pass manager, load-time program
synthesis with the synthesizer, and post-synthesis validation with the validator. Given that
each countermeasure may depend on specific hardware features, the prober interacts with
the CPU and dynamically determines the availability of these features. Based on the probing
results, the pass manager determines an optimal set of countermeasures (i.e., instrumentation
passes) and the order of their enforcement. Next, the pass manager informs the selection
to the synthesizer and the validator. The synthesizer takes a Wasm binary (via a secure
network channel) as an input and compiles it into a native one. During the compilation, the
synthesizer hardens the binary with the optimal pass set the pass manager provides. The
validator takes the synthesized binary as an input. Then, it performs the binary analysis
specified in the validation passes. The analysis ensures the correct enforcement of each
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countermeasure and prevents the countermeasures from conflicting each other. Once the
binary successfully passes the validation, the loader starts executing the binary.
5.3.3 User-mode Hardware Probing
The goal of hardware probing is to allow the PRIDWEN loader to acquire the specific
hardware configurations of the underlying system dynamically. Based on the knowledge of
the hardware configurations, the PRIDWEN loader determines the optimal set of mitigation
schemes to enforce during the later stages. Figuring out the hardware configurations
typically requires interactions with the underlying system. For example, executing the
cpuid instruction that system software can hook and virtualize, and retrieving privileged
registers (i.e., Model-Specific Register (MSR) and control registers). Unfortunately, we
cannot rely on these approaches because the system software is not trustworthy in our threat
model. Instead, we leverage exception handling and remote attestation to probe hardware
configurations inside an enclave.
Exception-based probing. Our user-mode hardware probing relies on the custom excep-
tion handler for SGX (§2.2) to test whether an exception is generated when we try to use a
specific hardware feature. Systems software cannot suppress exceptions generated during
an enclave execution. Thus, to proceed with the execution of an enclave, systems software
has to call a custom exception handler inside an enclave that inspects exception information
to handle it and proceeds the execution by changing GPRSGX.RIP.
Intel CPU’s instructions show two different behaviors when they are disabled or not
supported: 1) generating a #UD exception (e.g., TSX) or 2) being treated as a nop instruc-
tion (e.g., Memory Protection Extensions (MPX) [26, §17.4]). If executing a disabled or
unsupported instruction results in a #UD exception, we can use a custom exception handler
to detect it as shown in Figure 5.2. If it is treated as nop, we have to rely on its semantics
to generate other exceptions. For example, to test whether MPX is available, we can setup
an arbitrary boundary with bndmk and execute either bndcl or bndcu with out-of-bound
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1 #define UD 6 /* Invalid opcode exception */
2
3 bool tsx_support = false;
4 check_tsx_support:
5 _xbegin();






12 if (SSA.GPRSGX.EXITINFO.VECTOR == UD &&
13 SSA.GPRSGX.RIP == check_tsx_support) {
14 GPRSGX.RIP = skip_tsx_check;
15 }
Figure 5.2: Exception-based probing code for TSX. If a CPU does not support TSX, there will be a
#UD exception that needs to be handled by an in-enclave exception handler to proceed execution (i.e.,
changing GPRSGX.RIP).
ranges. If it results in a bound range exceeded (#BR) exception, we can confirm that MPX is
available. To test whether Execute Disable (XD) is configured, we can try to execute a data
page consisting of ud instructions and check whether it results in a #GP (XD is enabled) or a
#UD (XD is disabled).
Remote attestation for hardware configuration. Remote attestation allows PRIDWEN to
accurately determine several hardware configurations, i.e., HT and IBRS. If a remote device
turns on HT, an attestation verification report can contain CONFIGURATION_NEEDED in the
isvEnclaveQuoteStatus field since the attestation API version 3 [186, 187]. PRIDWEN
could leverage this information to selectively adopt mitigation for preventing hyperthread co-
locations [22, 21]. Also, if a remote device does not install the microcode update for indirect
branch control mechanisms, a remote attestation protocol will fail with GROUP_OUT_OF_DATE [188].
If a developer still wants to run his/her code in such a remote device, he/she can adopt
software-based approaches [177] against speculative side-channel attacks.
5.3.4 Pass Manager
For extensibility, we implement a pass manager as a part of the PRIDWEN loader allowing
for smooth integration of a pass that supports a new mitigation scheme. More specifically,
the manager provides a set of high-level APIs that allows the developers of side-channel
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Table 5.2: The APIs for the instrumentation (top) and validation (bottom) support. CCTX:
CompilerContext. MI: MachineInstr. MCTX: MachineContext. MB: MachineBasicBlock.
API Hooking point
onFunctionStart(CCTX *c) Beginning of a function
onFunctionEnd(CCTX *c) End of a function
onControlStart(CCTX *c) Beginning of a control statement
onControlEnd(CCTX *c) End of a control statement
onInstrStart(CCTX *c) Before a IR-level instruction
onInstrEnd(CCTX *c) After a IR-level instrcution
onMachineInstrStart(CCTX *c, MI *i) Before a native instruction.
onMachineInstrEnd(CCTX *c, MI *i) After a native instrcution
validate(MCTX *c, MB *b) Beginning of a basic block
mitigation schemes to implement their instrumentation and validation passes and plug them
into the loader. During the load time, the pass manager maintains a list of plugged-in passes,
determining the optimal set of passes for the synthesizer and the validator to execute, and
resolving the correct execution order of each selected pass.
Pass APIs. Table 5.2 lists the high-level APIs for implementing instrumentation and vali-
dation passes. For instrumentation, we expose all the hooks as APIs. To reflect the structure
of a Wasm module, we classify the IR-level hooks into the granularity of functions, controls,
and instructions. Each hook can obtain the information about the hooking IR instruction
and the current states of compilation via the CompilerContext (CCTX) data structure. For
the native level, the hook should consult the information of the native instruction via the
MachineInstr (MI) data structure. The reason for this is that CompilerContext does not
track such information (i.e., not necessary for the compilation process to proceed). Similar
to instrumentation, we expose the basic-block-level procedure as an API for implement-
ing a validation pass. The procedure can obtain the raw bytes of the basic block from
the MachineBasicBlock (MB) data structure. We also allow the procedure to obtain more
high-level information of the corresponding basic block via the MachineContext (MCTX) data
structure.
Pass selection and ordering. When plugging into the PRIDWEN loader, each pass is
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associated with a configuration file. The file specifies the type of SCA that it intends
to mitigate, hardware features or other passes that it depends on, and a list of passes
incompatible with it. Optionally, the file allows a pass to specify soft-dependent passes,
which indicates that the pass depends on any of its soft-dependent passes only when such
passes are available. During the initialization phase, the pass manager adds all the plugged-in
passes into a pass queue. For selecting the optimal set of passes, the pass manager consults
the prober about the current hardware configuration. Next, the pass manager checks the
dependency of each pass in the queue and drops a pass if its dependent hardware feature
is not available. Next, the pass manager checks the type of the side channels that each
active pass mitigates. If the pass manager identifies more than one passes targeting the same
SCA, it assigns a priority value to each of the passes and retains the one with the highest
value. For example, the pass manager assigns a high priority value to an active pass that has
lower overhead. This simple rule is sufficient for our current design. Optionally, we can
adopt sophisticated rules and optimization algorithms when the number of supported passes
increases.
To determine the execution order of active passes, the pass manager builds a dependency
graph of all the passes given the dependencies specified in configuration files. Next, the
pass manager uses the topological ordering of the graph as the execution order. The pass
manager may drop passes if their non-soft dependency does not meet or incompatible passes
are in the active pass set. Note that we assume the graph contains no circular dependencies.
If the graph does, our current design terminates the execution of the loader. Besides, if all
passes are independent, the pass manager uses the order of the passes in the queue as the
execution order.
5.3.5 Load-time Synthesis
The high-level goal of load-time synthesis is allowing the PRIDWEN loader to generate a
hardened binary from a given program and the optimal set of countermeasures (§5.3.4) based
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on the current hardware configuration. For this goal, our design adopts a Wasm binary as
input to the loader. Moreover, the loader supports the compilation chain, including parsing
and compilation, of the Wasm binary. We also extend the compilation chain to support both
IR- and native-level instrumentation that is flexible enough to implement various types of
SCA mitigation schemes.
Parsing. The parsing performs standard decoding on a Wasm binary and converts it into
the IR of a Wasm module. During the decoding, the process also validates the format of the
binary with several checks (e.g., type checking of functions) to guarantee the binary follows
the specification. Because of validations, any modification to the binary before parsing can
easily result in a rejection by the loader. For example, inserting an instruction that causes
the inconsistency on the stack machine renders the binary to be invalid.
Compilation. For generating a native binary given an IR of the Wasm module, the
synthesizer performs a single-pass compilation over each function in the module (similar to
the baseline compilation of SpiderMonkey [60] and V8 [189]). During the compilation of a
function, the synthesizer virtually executes each instruction based on the execution model of
the Wasm stack machine and generates the corresponding native code. More specifically,
the synthesizer maintains the operand stack internally as the virtual execution proceeds
(i.e., manipulating the stack based on the operations of each virtually executed instruction).
Based on the values on the stack and the type of an executed instruction, the synthesizer
generates one or more native instructions. The synthesizer also keeps track of the metadata
about each value on the operand stack. Such metadata includes the data type (e.g., i32, i64,
f32, or f64) and the actual position (e.g., a physical register, a location to the physical stack
frame of the function, or a constant value stored in the operand stack). The metadata of the
values on the operand stack is necessary for generating correct native code and for allowing
the synthesizer to perform type-checking when consuming each value as the operands of
the instruction. For determining the position of a value, the synthesizer adopts the linear
scan algorithm for register allocation [190]. Optionally, the synthesizer can adopt more
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sophisticated algorithms such as graph coloring [191] to improve the efficiency of register
allocation.
In addition to the operand stack, the synthesizer maintains a control stack that keeps
track of the control flow of the function. Pushing a value to the control stack indicates the
function initiates a new control statement (e.g., block, if, and loop instructions). On the
other hand, popping a value from the stack implies reaching the end of the current statement
(e.g., an end instruction). The control stack provides sufficient information, allowing the
synthesizer to resolve the target of a branch (e.g., a br instruction). The reason for this is
that Wasm permits only a structured control flow; i.e., the target of a branch can only be the
beginning of or the end of a previously initiated control statement.
After finishing the native code generation of all the functions, the synthesizer performs
relocation. The process patches all the unresolved address values in native instructions such
as call and the instructions for memory accesses. Note that branch instructions besides
call that are corresponding to IR-level branches do not require relocation because their
destinations are resolved during the phase of native code generation.
Instrumentation. To support flexible instrumentation, we extend the design of the com-
pilation to provide hooks at both IR- and native-level. For IR-level hooks, we place them
both before and after the position that synthesizer processes an IR instruction. Both the
hooks before and after the instruction support code insertion, modification, and deletion.
However, only the hooks before the instruction can manipulate the instruction itself. For
each hook, we provide sufficient information about the corresponding instruction and the
states of the compilation at the given point, such as the operand and control stacks, that
enable program analysis and instrumentation. Besides, all the instrumentation made via the
hooks also updates the states of the compilation accordingly.
The synthesizer may generate more than one native instructions for a single IR instruction.
In such a scenario, the IR-level hooks are not sufficient to support mitigation schemes that
require the information about native instructions. For this reason, we provide similar hooks
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at the native level (i.e., surrounding the generation of native instructions). To allow for
inserting or modifying a native instruction that requires relocation, we provide an option
to create instructions with symbols. A symbol refers to a target location that allows the
synthesizer to recognize and resolve it during the relocation phase.
Despite being flexibility, all the instrumentations made via hooks should respect the
state of compilation. More concretely, an arbitrary manipulation that affects the states such
as the operand or control stack may result in a compilation failure or unexpected behavior
during the runtime of the instrumented binary. For the case of the compilation failure, an
example is inserting an IR instruction that pushes values to the operand stack, causing a
type checking failure when the next instruction consumes the values. For the case of the
unexpected runtime behavior, one example is inserting a control instruction that results in
modifying the target of the following branch instructions. Another example is inserting a
native instruction that overwrites a value stored in an in-use register or memory location. The
PRIDWEN validator checks whether a compiled binary suffers from the above-mentioned
errors (§5.3.6).
System call support. Wasm is designed to run in a sandboxed environment within a web
browser. Thus, a Wasm binary by default does not use any system calls. Invoking a system
call from a Wasm requires additional runtime support. For example, the binary makes a call
to an imported function that is outside of the binary. PRIDWEN provides runtime support
that is compatible with an Emscripten-compiled [192] Wasm binary, which consists of
wrapper functions for all the system calls. In addition, PRIDWEN implements OCall-based
system call interfaces for these wrapper functions, which are similar to those of [14, 17,
193]. Recently, Mozilla starts to standardize WebAssembly System Interface (WASI) to run




Except for cases that result in compilation failures, the synthesizer does not assume how an
instrumentation pass manipulates a binary. On the one hand, the flexibility of instrumentation
provides the potential for implementing various types of mitigation schemes. On the other
hand, such flexibility indicates that an instrumentation pass can arbitrarily modify the binary.
Such modifications can potentially affect the other passes (e.g., creating security holes or
invalidating the expected protection) or break the binary itself (e.g., causing unexpected
runtime behavior). To avoid such cases, we add the validator to the PRIDWEN loader
that enables post-synthesis validation. Post-synthesis validation aims for supporting static
analysis over a PRIDWEN-synthesized binary (i.e., the binary generated by the synthesizer)
before its execution. Unlike typical binary analysis that assumes a stripped binary, post-
synthesis validation enables more sophisticated analysis by taking advantage of the metadata
(e.g., the control-flow information) that the synthesizer provides.
Validation passes. An analysis of post-synthesis validation takes the form of a validation
pass. Based on the control-flow information, the validator executes the pass at the basic-
block level. More specifically, the validator iterates all functions in the binary and, at the
beginning of each basic block, invokes a procedure that the pass implements. The procedure
performs a series of checks based on the content of the basic block (i.e., raw bytes). For
example, the procedure determines whether specific instrumentation is applied based on
pattern matching. If any of the checks fail, the procedure rejects the binary. Optionally, the
procedure can utilize other metadata such as the original IR instructions that map to the
basic block to facilitate the analysis beyond binary scanning.
5.4 Case Study
In this section, we examine four SCA mitigation schemes (ASLR, Varys, T-SGX, and
QSpectre) that demonstrate how we support these schemes on top of PRIDWEN. These
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Table 5.3: Attack surfaces and software-only or hardware-assisted mitigation schemes PRIDWEN
implements. CPUs with recent microcode update do not have some of the attack surfaces.
Attack surface Mitigation
SW-only HW-assisted
Cache timing Interrupt (Varys) Cache flushing (microcode)
Page fault Interrupt (Varys) T-SGX
HT Co-location (Varys) HT disabling (microcode)
Speculative execution QSpectre IBRS (microcode)
Static layout ASLR N/A
schemes cover five different SCA surfaces: cache timing, page fault, HT, speculative
execution, and static layout (Table 5.3), in which three of them (cache, HT, and speculative
execution) are closed by recent microcode update [18, 19]. That is, some of them are
redundant depending on hardware configurations. It is worth noting that the primary goal of
our case studies is to show that PRIDWEN is general enough to support various mechanisms.
It is not about faithfully implementing and/or improving them.
5.4.1 Fine-grained ASLR
In addition to mitigating memory corruption vulnerabilities, fine-grained ASLR that diversi-
fies the runtime behavior of a binary offers general protection against SCAs [14]. However,
enabling fine-grained ASLR in an SGX enclave is not straightforward because the enclave
relies on the system software to set up the memory layout during the initialization phase. As
a result, the memory layout, even if it is randomized, of the enclave is known by an attacker
who controls the system software. Fortunately, PRIDWEN does not suffer from this problem
because it dynamically generates final binaries.
Instrumentation. Our instrumentation pass of fine-grained ASLR randomizes the locations
of each basic block. Similar to SGX-Shield, our pass inserts a jmp instruction at the end of
every basic block. More specifically, the pass uses the onControlStart and onControlEnd
APIs (Table 5.2) to identify the structure of a basic block. Next, the pass inserts a jmp with
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a symbol that points to the successor of the basic block if it does not end with a jmp. The
pass also updates the targets of all the other branches that point to a basic block accordingly
by using onMachineInstrEnd. After the code generation phase, the synthesizer shuffles
the placement of each basic block if the ASLR pass is enabled. During the relocation, the
symbols that the pass generates allow the synthesizer to resolve the target of each branch,
pointing to a basic block at a randomized location.
Validation. To validate the instrumentation done by the pass, we implement a validation
pass performing the following checks: 1) whether a basic block terminates with a jmp and
2) whether each branch points to the correct target (based on the control-flow information).
5.4.2 T-SGX
T-SGX [17] is a compiler-based mitigation scheme targets specifically at page-fault SCAs.
The key idea of T-SGX is to execute an enclave inside TSX transactions. As a result, all
page faults occur during the execution are suppressed (i.e., not delivered to the system
software). However, one challenge of utilizing TSX is that each transaction can execute only
a limited number of instructions (bounded by the capacity of L1 cache and the frequency
of interrupts). To overcome the challenge, T-SGX splits a program binary into multiple
code blocks (consisting of several basic blocks) and places each block into an individual
transaction. To determine the splitting points, T-SGX performs static analysis that estimates
both cache usage and execution time of each basic block. Based on the estimation, T-SGX
composes code blocks concerning the cache and time constraints. Another challenge is that
a transaction does not include the instructions for initiating (xbegin) and terminating (xend)
the transaction. To solve this problem, T-SGX adopts a springboard design. Instead of
surrounding every code block with xbegin and xend, T-SGX modifies the target of branch
instructions in each code block to a springboard. The springboard includes a piece of code
that manages the transitions between consecutive transactions. Note that as transactions also
abort upon interrupts, T-SGX is also able to detect interrupt-based SCAs.
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Instrumentation. The T-SGX pass implements cache usage and execution time analyzers
for native instructions with the onMachineInstrEnd API. Based on the analysis results, the
pass determines the scope of a code block. Next, the pass replaces branch instructions
at the end of the block with the instructions for jumping to the springboard (i.e., a lea
for saving the address of the next code block and a jmp to the springboard). Similar to
the pass for fine-grained ASLR, the T-SGX pass identifies basic blocks in the binary by
using the onControlStart and onControlEnd APIs. For the springboard support, the pass
places the springboard code before the entry function (e.g., main) of the binary by using
onFunctionStart.
Validation. The validation pass for T-SGX checks 1) the existence of the springboard,
2) the existence of the instructions to jump into the springboard at the end of every code
block, and 3) the target of the instructions correctly points to the springboard. Optionally,
the pass can re-analyze cache usage and execution time to ensure the correctness of the code
splitting.
5.4.3 Varys
Varys is software-based mitigation against high-frequency, interrupt- and HT-based SCAs.
High-frequency AEX detection. Varys consists of two key designs: interrupt detection
and interrupt frequency estimation. Similar to exceptions, an interrupt causes an AEX and an
update to the SSA. As a result, Varys detects the occurrence of an interrupt by periodically
polling the value of SSA. To estimate the interrupt frequency, Varys instruments the binary
by inserting a piece of checking code into every basic block. The code maintains a counter
that tracks the number of instructions has been executed since the last SSA polling and
compares the counter against a configurable threshold. The threshold indicates the frequency
of AEX detection; i.e., if the counter exceeds the threshold, the code invokes the SSA
polling routine. The routine either resets the counter for two cases. One is if no interrupt
has occurred. Another is that the program has made sufficient progress since the last AEX
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(i.e., the number of executed instructions is large enough). Otherwise, the routine terminates
the execution, which ensures that an attacker cannot interrupt the program too frequent.
To prevent potential leakage through caches, Varys also manually evicts cache lines upon
detecting an AEX. However, recent microcode update provides the same effect and therefore
eliminates such manual evictions.
Limitation. The security of Varys depends on how frequently it checks SSA and the value
of the threshold. For example, to ensure a high-security level, the scheme has to insert the
checking code as frequently as possible (i.e., at each basic block). Less-frequent insertion of
checks otherwise allows an attacker to frequently interrupt the program between two checks
such that preventing the counter from reaching the threshold. Consequently, this tradeoff
prevents performance optimization (e.g., inserting checks outside of a loop body) without
compromising the security (see examples in §5.6).
Co-location test. To prevent HT-based SCAs, Vary incorporates a method that prevents
privileged attackers from scheduling an arbitrary thread on the same physical core running
a target enclave. The idea is always requesting the OS to schedule an in-enclave thread
alone with the original enclave on the same physical cores. To verify the co-location of
two threads, Varys establishes a cache-based covert channel between the two threads and
determines whether they share L1 or last-level caches. Sharing L1 cache indicates the two
threads co-locate. Varys performs the co-location test whenever detecting an occurrence
of an interrupt. Since the initial version of SGX does not support trusted time source (e.g.,
rdtsc), Varys uses an alternative approach that spawns an in-enclave thread. The thread
keeps incrementing a global counter, representing ticks.
Instrumentation. The instrumentation pass of Varys inserts the checking code at the
beginning of every basic block by using onControlStart and onControlEnd. Unlike the
original Varys design that counts the number the instructions at the LLVM IR level, our
pass counts the number of native instructions with the help of onMachineInstrEnd. For the
SSA polling routine, the pass inserts the code before the entry function of the binary via
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onFunctionStart. For supporting the co-location test, the pass adds a piece of code that
does the test to the SSA polling routine (i.e., after detecting an AEX). Unlike the detection
of high-frequency AEX, the co-location test is not overlapped with T-SGX. As a result, we
add the optional support of the co-location test to the T-SGX. More concretely, we put the
same piece of code at the springboard, before initiating a transaction with xbegin.
Validation. The validation pass performs the checking of 1) the existence of the checking
code, 2) the correctness of the instruction number added to the counter, 3) the existence of
the SSA polling code, and 4) whether the target of the call in the checking code points to
the SSA polling routine.
5.4.4 QSpectre
For mitigating the Spectre attack, one software-based approach is utilizing serializing
instructions (e.g, lfence) that prevent the CPU from speculatively executing instructions
beyond the placement of these instructions. Following this idea, the Microsoft Visual Studio
has implemented a compiler-based scheme, QSpectre [177]. During the compilation, the
scheme tries to find potentially vulnerable code patterns and inserts the lfence instruction
to the code.
Instrumentation. Unlike inserting lfence based on the pattern matching, which could be
bypassed [195], our instrumentation pass for QSpectre adopts a simple, yet effective strategy:
inserting lfence to all if-else structures. More concretely, inserting lfence right after a
conditional branch in the code with an if-else structure. For implementing the strategy, the
pass uses the onMachineInstrEnd API and determines if a conditional branch is in a if-else
structure by consulting CompilerContext.
Validation. To validate QSpectre, the pass simply checks the existence of the lfence
instruction in every if-else structure.
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5.4.5 Pass Integration
Assuming the PRIDWEN loader supports all the abovementioned passes, we show how the
pass manager selects the optimal passes. Moreover, we demonstrate how a pass resolves the
potential conflicts with other passes.
Pass selection. Given that T-SGX and Varys have similar goals, we consider the passes of
the two schemes targeting the same type of SCAs (e.g., high-frequency, page-fault attacks).
To determine which pass to enable, the pass manager consults the prober and checks whether
TSX is available in the current hardware environment. If TSX is available, the pass manager
puts the T-SGX pass into the active set. Meanwhile, the pass manager drops the Varys pass
according to the priority assignment rule (i.e., low runtime overhead). However, if TSX is
not available, the pass manager performs oppositely. When detecting both TSX and HT are
available, the pass manager additionally enables the co-location test in the T-SGX pass (e.g.,
inserting the co-location test code in the springboard).
Regarding the QSpectre pass, the pass manager activates it only if the prober reports
that the HT is enabled and/or the microcode is outdated (i.e., no IBRS). Both cases indicate
that the binary in the current hardware environment may be vulnerable to the Spectre attack.
Lastly, the pass manager enables the fine-grained ASLR pass by default because it does not
depend on any hardware features. It is worth mentioning that the explained pass selection
policy is just an example. PRIDWEN can transparently support any developer-provided
policies by design.
Conflicts resolving. Enabling multiple passes at the same time may lead to conflicts among
the passes. For example, the ASLR and T-SGX passes can compete with each other to
instrument the branch at the end of a basic block. Also, when enabling T-SGX pass alone,
figuring out the address of the next code block for the pass is easy because of the fixed
the memory layout. However, this is not the case when enabling the T-SGX and ASLR
passes together. To resolve such conflicts, a pass (instrumentation and validation) should
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implement additional logic that detects the existence of other active passes and handles the
potential conflicts with each of the passes. For example, the T-SGX pass consults the pass
manager about the existence of the ASLR pass. The ASLR pass inserts jmps at the end of
each basic block and associates each jmp with a symbol pointing to its successor. With such
knowledge, the T-SGX pass replaces each jmp with a lea, reuses the symbols for the lea,
and inserts another jmp, pointing to the springboard. This approach requires the execution
order of the ASLR pass is ahead of that of the T-SGX pass. For this purpose, the T-SGX
pass specifies the ASLR pass as a soft dependency in the configuration file.
5.4.6 Security Analysis
For each of the mitigation schemes, PRIDWEN provides a similar level of protection com-
pared to its original design. We have experimentally verified such protection with both
static (e.g., validation passes) and dynamic (e.g., runtime testing) approaches. For example,
a T-SGX-enforced binary successfully suppresses page faults during the runtime, and a
Varys-enforced binary terminates under frequent AEXs. Besides, by combining multiple
mitigation schemes, PRIDWEN provides either a higher level of protection or better runtime
performance compared to enforcing single mitigation. For example, although ASLR diversi-
fies the runtime behavior of a program, the program is still subject to SCAs, which allows
an attacker to learn the randomized layout of the program incrementally. Instead, combining
ASLR and Varys prevents an attacker from obtaining fine-grained side-channel information
of the program runtime. As a result, the combination secures the program against other
types of SCAs (e.g., low-frequent SCAs) that are effective when enforcing only one of
the mitigations. Another example is supporting the co-location test on top of T-SGX. This
combination provides not only a similar level of protection of Varys (against high-frequent
SCAs) but also a better runtime performance.
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5.5 Implementation
We implement a prototype of PRIDWEN with 25k lines of C code on top of the Intel Linux
SGX SDK 2.5.102. For native code generation, we implement an x86 backend as part of
the prototype that provides minimal support for the Wasm instructions set. Because the
dynamic memory management in SGX [196] has yet to receive public support from CPUs,
our prototype reserves 8 MiB of memory with RWX permissions for placing the synthesized
native code, which is sufficient for all the programs in our evaluations. Wasm by default
runs in a sandbox with memory safety, so using RWX memory pages is acceptable. In
addition, to prevent validation passes from overwriting the synthesized binary, our current
implementation makes the pass operate on a copy of the binary.
Runtime support. Our prototype provides an Emscripten-compatible runtime support that
allows for running fairly large, complex applications such as Lighttpd as shown in §5.6. The
application is directly compiled from unmodified C source code to a Wasm binary via the
Emscripten compiler.
Pass implementations. Our prototype includes all of the four passes mentioned in
§5.4. Each pass takes on average 800 lines of code. Because the control-flow information
(including the definition of basic blocks in the binary) is generally required by most of
the passes, we implement a control-flow analysis pass to share the information with other
passes.
Attestation of synthesized binaries. The standard remote attestation of SGX works for
the PRIDWEN loader (which is static), but not for the synthesized binaries that the PRIDWEN
loader generates (which are dynamic). However, since the PRIDWEN loader can be attested,
we can build a chain of trust from it. Further, the PRIDWEN loader accepts input Wasm
binaries and passes only via a secure channel. These attested loader and secure binary
deployment are similar to the remote attestation support of SGX-LKL [197].
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5.6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate PRIDWEN by answering the following questions.
• What are the performance characteristics of the PRIDWEN loader?
• Does the execution of a PRIDWEN-synthesized binary remain faithful to the semantics
of the input Wasm program?
• What is the performance of PRIDWEN-synthesized binaries? How much overheads
do mitigation schemes incur?
Experimental setup. We ran all the experiments on a machine with a 4-core Intel i7-
6700K CPU (Skylake microarchitecture) operating at 4 GHz with 32 KiB L1 and 256 KiB
L2 private caches, an 8 MiB L3 shared cache, and 64 GiB of RAM. The machine was
running Linux kernel 4.15. The PRIDWEN loader is compiled with gcc 5.4.0 and executed
on top of the Intel Linux SGX SDK 2.5.102.
Applications. We base our evaluation on a benchmark suite, PolyBench [198], and three
real-world applications or libraries: Lighttpd 1.4.48 [76], libjpeg 9a [77], and SQLite
3.21.0 [75]. The benchmark suite consists of 23 small C programs with only numerical
computations (i.e., no system calls) that are used to evaluate the runtime performance of
just-in-time compiled Wasm binaries against that of native ones [60]. In addition to the
micro-benchmark suite, we use Lighttpd, libjpeg, and SQLite as a macro-benchmark suite
that represents large, complex applications. We compile the original source code of each
micro- or macro-benchmark program into Wasm using Emscripten [192], an LLVM-based
compiler. We also directly port all of the programs using SGX SDK that serve as baseline
versions.
Methodology. For each run of experiments, we take the application in the form of Wasm
as an input to PRIDWEN. To evaluate PRIDWEN-synthesized binaries with distinct sets
of defense schemes enforced, we manually configure PRIDWEN before each run. We
use PRIDWEN-base to represent the configuration of baseline compilation (i.e., without
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Table 5.4: Comparison of lines of code and binary size between PRIDWEN and LLVM backends.
Line of code Binary size ( MiB)
PRIDWEN backend 8,166 1.26
LLVM backend 80,449 1026.00
instrumentation) and the name of defense schemes to represent the configuration of enforcing
the corresponding schemes. For example, TSGX indicates the configuration with T-SGX-
enforced and TSGX+CoTest indicates the configuration with both T-SGX- and co-location-
test-enforced. For the ease of comparing Varys and T-SGX, the rest of the section uses
Varys, or VARYS, to represent its original design without co-location test. To measure the
execution time of each application, we use the rdtsc instruction via an OCall inside an
enclave. The reported results are averaged over 10 runs.
5.6.1 Performance Characteristics of the PRIDWEN Loader
Complexity. To evaluate the complexity of the PRIDWEN loader, we compare its imple-
mentation against the implementation of LLVM 6.0.0 in terms of lines of code and binary
size. More specially, we focus on comparing the implementation of x86 backend between
the PRIDWEN loader and LLVM. For lines of code, we calculate the lines of C/C++ code in
both implementations. For the binary size, we compare the size of the entire loader binary
against the llc binary, which is the backend compiler of LLVM (i.e., generating an x86
binary from a LLVM bitcode).
Results. Table 5.4 shows the results. Both lines of code and the binary size of LLVM
backend are significantly larger than that of the PRIDWEN loader. The results indicate that
adopting the LLVM backend in the SGX environment may be unrealistic. More specifically,
given the limited size of SGX memory (∼96 MiB), the size of the llc binary is too large
to fit into an enclave. Further, long lines of code increase the size of the trusted computing
base of an SGX program and the level of difficulties for security analysis. On the other hand,






























































































































Figure 5.5: The runtime performance of PRIDWEN-synthesized programs compared to the native
binary.
compiling Wasm binary, is more compact and suitable for the SGX environment.
Runtime and memory overheads. To show both runtime and memory overheads of the
PRIDWEN loader, we measured the execution time that the loader takes to generate native
binaries and the additional memory that the loader allocates during the entire process (by
hooking malloc). To demonstrate the impact on the size of input, we used one small (2mm,
52 kB) and one large (lighttpd, 462 kB) Wasm binaries as inputs. We also ran experiments
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Figure 5.6: The runtime performance of PRIDWEN-synthesized programs secured with mitigation
schemes.
defense schemes or combinations of them. Note that as the co-location test depends on
either T-SGX or Varys and requires only adding a piece of code to each scheme, we do not
include the test in the selected configurations.
Results. Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 present the results. We divide each bar into three parts:
the execution time of the initialization stage (red), the execution time of the synthesis stage
(blue), and the additional execution time to the synthesis stage when the ASLR is enforced
together on top of the corresponding configuration (green). The initialization stage includes
the time spent on hardware probing, pass manager initialization, and Wasm decoding. The
synthesis state represents the time spent on compilation, instrumentation, and validation.
For the runtime overheads, the results show that, given the same input, the execution
time of the initialization stage is fixed regardless of the configurations. Moreover, the
loader spends more time during the initialization stage for the larger input, which is mostly
contributed by the process of parsing the Wasm binary. However, the proportion of the
execution time spent in the initialization stage decreases, which indicates that the loader
spends more time on the synthesis stage for the large input. We also observe that enabling
ASLR for the larger input incurs higher overhead than for the smaller one. The reason lies
in that a larger program usually results in many basic blocks. As a result, the loader takes
more time to place these blocks. In addition, enforcing more schemes incurs high overheads
as expected. However, the execution time is generally reasonable (less than 500 ms even
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with a large input). Moreover, each input requires only one-time initialization and synthesis
before starting the execution.
For the memory overheads, the results show that the loader requires a fixed amount of
memory during the initialization stage for the same input. The majority of the required
memory is used to store the IR of the input program during the parsing process, which also
explains that the loader requires a significantly large amount of memory for a large input.
We also observe a similar memory requirement for the loader with the PRIDWEN-base
configuration in the synthesis stage. Such a requirement represents the amount of memory
that the loader needs for maintaining the metadata during the baseline compilation. Another
observation is that enabling ASLR on top of PRIDWEN-base incurs the highest overhead.
The reason behind this is that the instrumentation passes of each scheme all depend on a
pass for obtaining control-flow graph (CFG) information, which contributes to the majority
of the memory overhead when enabling ASLR on top the PRIDWEN-base. On the other
hand, as the ASLR pass shares the CFG information with other passes, enabling ASLR on
top of them incurs less overhead. Although the memory overhead of the loader is relatively
high for large inputs, such memory is only required before the execution of the synthesized
binary and therefore does not affect the runtime of the binary.
5.6.2 Faithfulness of Execution
One important aspect of PRIDWEN is whether a synthesized binary follows the semantics
of the corresponding Wasm program regardless of its configuration. To validate whether
the synthesized program behaves as expected, we use the official Wasm specification test
suite [183], which provides comprehensive test cases for all Wasm instructions. The test
suite consists of 73 programs. Each program includes a set of functions and test cases
that specify the expected output of a function with corresponding input. We ran the test
suite on PRIDWEN with all configurations and reported the results in terms of pass or fail




























11 cmpq $100, %rcx
12 jbe loop.body




Figure 5.7: The comparison of Varys and T-SGX on a loop structure.
the benchmark programs (by manually inserting printf) for both baseline and PRIDWEN-
synthesized version and compare them.
Results. The results from the test suite show that programs with all the configurations
successfully pass all the test cases, which indicates that not only the baseline compilation
of PRIDWEN (PRIDWEN-base) faithfully follows the specification of Wasm but also the
enforcement of schemes does not modify the behavior of the program. For the results of
comparing intermediate values between baseline and PRIDWEN-synthesized binaries, we
did not aware of any difference, which indicates a similar conclusion from the results of the
test suite.
5.6.3 Performance of Synthesized Binaries
This section demonstrates the performance of PRIDWEN-synthesized binaries including
runtime and memory overheads, and the sizes of the binaries. We compare the results of
the baseline compilation against those of native binaries that we port directly to the SGX
environment. In addition, we show the impact of defense schemes that PRIDWEN supports
by comparing the results of using each configuration against that of the PRIDWEN-base
configuration.
Runtime performance. Figure 5.5 shows the results of running the Polybench with the
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PRIDWEN-base configuration, which are normalized to the execution time of the baseline
programs. Our results indicate that PRIDWEN-synthesized binaries have negligible slow-
down or are even faster than native binaries, without any mitigation schemes enforced. The
execution time of PRIDWEN-synthesized binaries are 0.7–1.0× of that of the native binaries.
In contrast, the evaluation of the in-browser compiler reports similar results with the majority
of programs within 1–2× slowdown [60].
Figure 5.6 demonstrates the results of running Polybench each of defense schemes
enforced. We show the results of enforcing multiple schemes in the following case studies
of real-world applications. The bar on the figure represents the relative execution time of the
program to the PRIDWEN-base configuration. The results indicate that ASLR incurs various
overheads, while lies in the characteristics of the program: The number of randomized basic
blocks being executed, which is not cache-friendly. Similarly, QSpectre also incurs various
but smaller overheads, which come from the number of lfence instructions being executed.
Regarding TSGX and VARYS, the former incurs less overhead than the latter. This
is mainly because Varys has to check the number of AEXs even inside a loop structure
(see an example in Figure 5.7). Varys cannot avoid this issue unless it compromises its
security guarantees (i.e., less frequent security checks). T-SGX incurs lower overhead than
Varys because it supports loop optimization (i.e., puts an entire loop into a single transaction
when possible). This comparison also illustrates the performance benefit of using hardware-
assisted mitigation schemes over software-based ones. In addition, the evaluation results
show that CoTest incurs small overheads (less than 10%) to both T-SGX and Varys. Note
that CoTest requires two more concurrent threads for the software timer and the co-located
memory access. PRIDWEN can eliminate these overheads when it detects a target platform
disables HT.
Memory overhead. Figure 5.8 shows how much memory each mitigation demands on
top of the binaries with PRIDWEN-base. On average, the instrumented binaries require up
















































































































Figure 5.10: The runtime performance of lighttpd with various settings. QS: QSpectre.
synthesized Polybench binaries are on average 1.5× larger than those of native binaries. This
is because Emscripten generates redundant code when compiling a program from C source
to Wasm. Also, the Wasm compiler of PRIDWEN generates less-optimized code compared

































Figure 5.11: The runtime performance of synthesized libjpeg and SQLite.
Case study: Real-world applications. We use three real-world applications as case
studies for demonstrating that PRIDWEN provides sufficient support for large, complex
programs. In addition to the Lighttpd (a webserver), the other two applications are based
on libjpeg and SQLite libraries. More specifically, the libjpeg application supports both
compressing and decompressing a jpeg image and the SQLite application supports basic
database operations including insert, select, update, and delete. Regarding the methodology,
we use the HTTP benchmarking tool, wrk, for evaluating the throughputs of the Lighttpd.
For the other two applications, we measure the time of each supported operation and report
the average over multiple runs. We apply various configurations to these applications, which
mainly focus on the performance impact of applying combinations of multiple mitigation
schemes.
Results. Figure 5.10 shows the results of Lighttpd. The slowdown of PRIDWEN-base is
1.5× to the native version. Similar to the results of Polybench, TSGX incurs fewer overheads
compared to VARYS. However, ASLR incurs significant overhead because the Lighttpd
has a large number of small-sized basic blocks. This shortens the gap between TSGX and
VARYS when they are enforced with ASLR. When enforcing multiple mitigation schemes,
the slowdown of Lighttpd is up to 6× compared to the native binary.
Figure 5.11 presents the results of libjpeg and SQLite in terms of their operations. We
use the stacked bars to represent the incurred overheads when applying a mitigation scheme
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on top of a configuration. The slowdowns of PRIDWEN-base is 1.2–1.7× to the native
versions. We note that such slowdowns are a way better than state-of-the-art results, which
shows that Wasm can be up to 3.14× slower than native execution [182]. The overheads of
an individual mitigation scheme are similar to the results of PolyBench (e.g., TSGX incurs
fewer overheads than VARYS does and ASLR incurs various overheads). The slowdown
of applying multiple mitigation schemes on top of Varys is up to 5.3× while the case of
T-SGX is bounded by 2.7×. Thus, depending on hardware configurations, hardware-assisted
mitigation schemes can be around 2× faster than software-only ones.
5.7 Discussion
Caching intermediate binaries. Instead of repeatedly synthesizing (and validating) SGX
programs, PRIDWEN might be able to cache intermediate binaries before adopting dynamic
passes (e.g., ASLR) along with the input Wasm binaries, static instrumentation passes, and
probing results into a sealed storage. Whenever PRIDWEN synthesizes an SGX program
again, it can first check whether the current Wasm binary, static instrumentation passes, and
probing results are identical to the cached ones. If they are identical, PRIDWEN can just
apply dynamic passes to the cached intermediate binary to generate a final binary.
Other hardening techniques. Although PRIDWEN mainly focuses on instrumentation
for microarchitectural side-channel attack mitigation, it can be extended to adopt other
hardware-assisted or software-only hardening techniques, such as Control-Flow Integrity
(CFI) and memory safety. For example, instead of relying on Wasm’s index-based CFI,
we can write a CFI pass with the Intel Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) [199].
Also, we can use Intel MPX or SGXBounds [200] for the spatial memory safety of SGX
programs. However, to fully support such hardening techniques, we need to extend Wasm
to provide more detailed information about memory object types and allocations [201]. In
addition, instead of the standard Wasm, we could extend PRIDWEN to use CT-Wasm [202]
for secure information flow and constant-time execution.
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5.8 Related Work
In-enclave loader. Developing in-enclave loaders is one of the actively researched topics
to enhance the security and deployability of Intel SGX. For security, several loaders leverage
randomization and encryption. SGX-Shield [14] is a compiler-based framework to load SGX
applications while enforcing fine-grained ASLR. VC3 [123] and SGXElide [203] deploy
encrypted SGX code while decrypting it within an enclave. Obfuscuro [204] obfuscates
SGX code with Oblivious RAM.
For the deployability, several loaders abstract the interface between code running inside
SGX and the outside. Ryoan [166] implements a two-way sandbox to securely execute
untrusted code inside an enclave. Haven [127], Graphene-SGX [129], and SGX-LKL [197]
run library Operating Systems (OSs) inside an enclave to executed unmodified programs.
Similarly, Scone [161] abstracts system call interfaces and Panoply [193] abstracts POSIX
interfaces to run unmodified programs with SGX.
Unlike these approaches, PRIDWEN focuses on how to customize SGX applications
according to underlying hardware characteristics to improve their security and performance.
SGX and Wasm. To the best of our knowledge, there are a few initial efforts to execute
Wasm interpreters inside an enclave. Rust-SGX [205] can be configured to use Wasm as a
backend. Se-Lambda [206] executes serverless functions written in Wasm inside an enclave.
Both approaches, however, run existing Wasm interpreters without notable improvements,
that is, supporting instrumentation and probing hardware configurations, which are the key
contributions of PRIDWEN.
Load-time program transformation. The basic concept of load-time program synthesis
or transformation is not completely new. Several Java frameworks, such as JOIE [207],
JMangler [208], and ASM [209], have been developed to transform Java classes according
to user-provided transformers. Unlike them, PRIDWEN is specialized for improving the
security of SGX programs while probing and leveraging the underlying hardware features.
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Wasm instrumentation. Other studies also instrument Wasm binaries to detect security
attacks and enable dynamic analysis. SEISMIC [184] instruments Wasm binaries to inject an
inline monitor for detecting . Wasabi [185] is a Dynamic Binary Instrumentation (DBI) tool
that statically instruments Wasm binaries to inject hooks and dynamically runs JavaScript-
based analysis code on them to find potential performance and security bugs. However,
unlike PRIDWEN, they do not consider instrumenting native binaries compiled from Wasm




CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Side channels, which stem from the implementation of the hardware, is not a unique problem
to SGX; i.e., any multi-tenant architecture such as the cloud generally suffers from side-
channel problems. However, SGX aims to provide a high-security standard: ensuring
the security of an application in the cloud without trusting the provider. Such an unusual
setting —attackers with root privileges— enables exceptionally powerful SCAs, making
these attacks become a critical threat to SGX. This thesis work attempts to address the
threat of SCAs practically. Toward this end, the thesis presents two defenses, including
SGX-Armor, an improved ASLR-based defense that provides general protection against
SCAs, and T-SGX, a novel, TSX-based defense that defeats controlled-channel attacks.
Besides, the thesis presents PRIDWEN, a general framework that addresses the limitations
of composing multiple defenses, including SGX-Armor and T-SGX, and thereby provides
a broader scope of protection against various types of SCAs. Despite not completely
eradicating SCAs on SGX, the proposed defenses have demonstrated the feasibility of
practical mitigation that is sufficient to render these SCAs ineffective.
Since this thesis primarily focuses on instrumentation-based defenses against SCAs
that automatically transform a program into a protected one, such defenses unavoidably
impose non-negligible overheads on the execution. A more fundamental reason for taking
this direction is that, unlike typical software vulnerabilities (e.g., memory corruptions),
side-channel vulnerabilities are difficult to identify; i.e., even a program may leak sensitive
information through side channels, and the presence of such leakage is stealthy to the
program. As a result, an alternative direction is to identify side-channel vulnerabilities
using static side-channel analysis. Similar to finding software bugs with static analysis,
side-channel analysis aims to detect code patterns that potentially cause information leakage
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through side channels. Consequently, side-channel analysis assists developers not only
to evaluate the implications of SCAs to their programs but to prevent the programs from
leaking information through side channels during the development phase.
PRIDWEN provides a broader scope of protection against SCAs by composing multiple
defenses. A potential concern with this approach is that when the number of supported
defenses raises, PRIDWEN may incur high runtime overhead to the program. Therefore,
instead of composing defenses, another potential direction is proposing a new software-
hardware co-design for SCA mitigation. The core idea of this direction is proposing new,
dedicated hardware instructions for SCA mitigation. Next, similar to T-SGX, the idea is to
design a software model for the instructions and to provide the same level of protection as
the composition of multiple defenses.
The other potential direction is to design an SCA defense framework for general TEEs.
Since SGX is merely one implementation of TEEs, the SCAs on SGX should be mostly
applicable to other implementations of TEEs, such as ARM TrustZone and AMD SEV. The
current trend in the industry community is also to create a TEE abstraction that is agnostic to
the implementations [170, 171]. Therefore, having an SCA defense framework for general
TEEs may be necessary in the near future.
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Privacy concerns for consumer cloud storage,” in Proceedings of the Seventh Sym-
posium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 2011.
132
[113] Samsung, White paper: An overview of Samsung knox, Enterprise Mobility Solutions,
2013.
[114] Trusted Computing Group, Trusted platform module (TPM) summary, http://www.
trustedcomputinggroup.org/trusted-platform-module-tpm-summary/.
[115] J. Greene, “Intel trusted execution technology,” Intel Technology White Paper, 2012.
[116] Intel, Intel software guard extensions programming reference (rev2), 329298-002US,
Oct. 2014.
[117] H. Takabi, J. B. Joshi, and G.-J. Ahn, “Security and privacy challenges in cloud
computing environments,” IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 24–31, 2010.
[118] C. Gentry, “Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices,” in Proceedings of
the 41st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2009.
[119] J. Li, M. Krohn, D. Mazières, and D. Shasha, “Secure untrusted data repository
(SUNDR),” in Proceedings of the 6th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems
Design and Implementation (OSDI), San Francisco, CA, Dec. 2004.
[120] A. J. Feldman, W. P. Zeller, M. J. Freedman, and E. W. Felten, “SPORC: Group
collaboration using untrusted cloud resources,” in Proceedings of the 9th USENIX
Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI), Vancouver,
Canada, Oct. 2010.
[121] P. Mahajan, S. Setty, S. Lee, A. Clement, L. Alvisi, M. Dahlin, and M. Walfish,
“Depot: Cloud storage with minimal trust,” in Proceedings of the 9th USENIX
Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI), Vancouver,
Canada, Oct. 2010.
[122] Intel, SGX Tutorial, ISCA 2015, http://sgxisca.weebly.com/, Portland, OR,
Jun. 2015.
[123] F. Schuster, M. Costa, C. Fournet, C. Gkantsidis, M. Peinado, G. Mainar-Ruiz, and
M. Russinovich, “VC3: Trustworthy data analytics in the cloud using SGX,” in
Proceedings of the 36th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland), San
Jose, CA, May 2015.
[124] T. T. A. Dinh, P. Saxena, E.-C. Cang, B. C. Ooi, and C. Zhang, “M2R: Enabling
stronger privacy in MapReduce computation,” in Proceedings of the 24th USENIX
Security Symposium (Security), Washington, DC, Aug. 2015.
[125] S. Kim, Y. Shin, J. Ha, T. Kim, and D. Han, “A first step towards leveraging com-
modity trusted execution environments for network applications,” in Proceedings of
133
the 14th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks (HotNets), Philadelphia, PA,
Nov. 2015.
[126] M.-W. Shih, M. Kumar, T. Kim, and A. Gavrilovska, “S-NFV: Securing NFV states
by using SGX,” in Proceedings of the 1st ACM International Workshop on Security
in SDN and NFV, New Orleans, LA, Mar. 2016.
[127] A. Baumann, M. Peinado, and G. Hunt, “Shielding applications from an untrusted
cloud with Haven,” in Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Symposium on Operating
Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI), Broomfield, Colorado, Oct. 2014.
[128] C.-C. Tsai, K. S. Arora, N. Bandi, B. Jain, W. Jannen, J. John, H. A. Kalodner,
V. Kulkarni, D. Oliveira, and D. E. Porter, “Cooperation and security isolation of
library OSes for multi-process applications,” in Proceedings of the 9th European
Conference on Computer Systems (EuroSys), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Apr.
2014.
[129] C.-C. Tsai and D. Porter, Graphene / Graphene-SGX Library OS - a library OS for
Linux multi-process applications, with Intel SGX support, https://github.com/
oscarlab/graphene.
[130] V. Costan and S. Devadas, Intel SGX explained, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2016/086, http://eprint.iacr.org/, 2016.
[131] B. Coppens, I. Verbauwhede, K. D. Bosschere, and B. D. Sutter, “Practical mitiga-
tions for timing-based side-channel attacks on modern x86 processors,” in Proceed-
ings of the 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland), Oakland, CA,
May 2009.
[132] S. M. Hand, “Self-paging in the Nemesis operating system,” in Proceedings of the
3rd USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI),
New Orleans, LA, Feb. 1999.
[133] L. Guan, J. Lin, B. Luo, J. Jing, and J. Wang, “Protecting private keys against
memory disclosure attacks using hardware transactional memory,” in Proceedings
of the 36th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland), San Jose, CA,
May 2015.
[134] O. S. Hofmann, S. Kim, A. M. Dunn, M. Z. Lee, and E. Witchel, “InkTag: Secure
applications on an untrusted operating system,” in Proceedings of the 18th ACM
International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages
and Operating Systems (ASPLOS), Houston, TX, Mar. 2013.
[135] M. Maas, E. Love, E. Stefanov, M. Tiwari, E. Shi, K. Asanović, J. Kubiatowicz,
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